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This research begins with two questions: Can the government of South Korea 
(SK) overcome the economic burden of Korean unification, and what will the effects of 
reunification be on the United States and China? This thesis focuses on manufacturing, 
the food industry, and infrastructure, since these three sectors will be the most important 
expenditures of a unified Korean government. To develop North Korea’s (NK’s) 
economy, the development of these three elements is essential; however, private capital 
and foreign investment will not come easily, because NK is certain to face political and 
economic instability in the early stages of unification.  
 By combining SK’s technology and  NK’s cheap labor, Korean unification might 
start a positive ripple effect throughout the global economy. In addition, the elimination 
of NK’s weapons of mass destruction and nuclear programs will contribute to world 
peace. In consideration of these effects of Korean unification, this thesis explores the 
benefits of unification for the two most influential countries in the process: the United 
States and China. The Koreas must persuade powerful countries that have an interest in 
Korea by conveying the positive effects of unification. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The Korean people wish for their unification; as children, they even sang a song 
about unification: “The desire for unification that is rooted in a sense of common 
ethnicity, cultural experience, and historical justice remains strong.”1 Although there are 
several military conflicts between South Korea and North Korea, Korea still wants 
unification. 
Since the Berlin Wall came down in 1989, Koreans have seriously dreamed of 
unification. Kim Il-sung’s sudden death, North Korea’s severe food crisis, and economic 
troubles gave Korea false hope. As a result, many scholars as well as the government 
have studied the possibility of North Korea’s collapse and unification scenarios. 
However, it has been difficult, and remains so now, to perform an accurate study because 
information about North Korea is limited, and the data is different from each agency. 
Estimates of the cost of unification vary depending on how the cost is determined; 
predictions range from $400 billion to $3.6 trillion.2  
Learning from Germany’s unification, the Korean people have realized that the 
enormous cost of unification is necessary. While going through the 1997 Asian economic 
crisis and the 2008 global economic crisis, Koreans have set a higher value on economic 
problems than any other problem. After the death of Kim Jung-il, they briefly anticipated 
unification, but Kim Jung-un, a new young leader, seemed to take power successfully. 
Because of the enormous cost of unification and the unlikeliness that North Korea will 
suddenly collapse, most South Koreans hesitate to prepare for the unification. 
Considering these circumstances, the purpose of my thesis is to determine 
whether Korea can overcome the economic burden of unification and what the economic 
effects to its neighbors will be. This research estimates the unification cost in three 
                                                 
1Joon Seok Hong, “The Economic Costs of Korean Reunification,” Spice Digest, Fall 2001, 
http://fsi.stanford.edu/docs/the_economic__costs_of_korean_reunification.   
2 Charles Wolf, Jr., “Korean Reunification: How It Might Come about and at What Cost,” Defence 
and Peace Economics 17, no. 6 (December 2006): 686.  
 2 
sectors: manufacturing, the food industry, and infrastructure. To receive international 
support, the Koreas should be able to persuade powerful countries that have an interest in 
Korea by estimating the effect on Koreans and their economy. Although President Park 
Geun-hye insists unification is a step on the ladder to becoming a more advanced 
country, most Koreans hesitate because of the expected economic burden. This thesis 
explores whether South Korea can overcome the economic burden based on current 
economic data, and it will also try to find the best way to reduce the unification cost. This 
thesis assumes that North Korea will implode and get absorbed by South Korea; this 
scenario is less attractive for South Korea, but it may be beneficial to estimate the most 
expensive scenario. Therefore, Koreans are able to prepare better for unification when 
faced with a situation that is expected. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
This thesis provides actual costs to help the Korean people make decisions 
regarding unification. It also analyzes the effect of unification on neighbor countries—
specifically, the United States and China. 
This research estimates the unification cost based on South Korea’s budget 
system, using examples from Germany’s unification. Moreover, this thesis assumes that a 
unified Korea will follow South Korea’s budget system and specific bureaucratic 
programs. Among them, the unification costs of manufacturing, food, and infrastructure 
sectors will be the most important sectors in the expenditures of a unified Korea 
government, in order to quickly raise the North Koreans’ quality of life and provide the 
basis for national reconstruction. This is because private capital and foreign investment 
will not come easily in North Korea in the early phases of unification. Therefore, the 
guidance of the government will be needed. The success of these sectors will be directly 
connected to the ability of North Korea to adapt as well as to achieve sustained growth in 
North Korea. 
Based on the six-party talks, unification will be accomplished. After the 
unification, the international situation around Korea will be totally changed in 
comparison to the current situation. Although a peaceful atmosphere can be created in the 
 3 
process of unification, a rising China will continue to be a regional hegemon in Asia; as a 
result, bipolarity may appear in Northeast Asia, like in the Cold War. Thus, this thesis 
considers the geopolitical situation around Korea and researches the national interests of 
two powerful states: the United States and China. By reviewing the interests of powerful 
countries, the two Koreas will be able to persuade them to support unification by 
estimating the economic effects and security benefits that will result from unification. 
Many Koreans have a positive attitude towards unification. Their thoughts about 
unification, however, vary depending on age and sex. Although the elderly are hoping to 
unify, young people, who will be main actors, are largely not interested in it (see Figure 
1).  
Figure 1.  The Proportion of Positive Attitude about Unification by Age and 
Sex 
 
Source: Kyuryoon Kim and Hyunggi Kim, “Unification Funding and the Perception of 
Public” (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, last updated February 3, 2015), 
http://www.unikorea.go.kr/content.do?cmsid=3096&mode=view&page=2&cid=42534. 
In March 2014, President Park Geun-hye said, “Unification is bonanza.” She 
insists unification is a step on the ladder to becoming a more advanced country. Through 






























provide help to overcome the economic burden that Koreans are expecting. Moreover, the 
prospect of the international situation in Northeast Asia would help get the support of 
neighbor countries and contribute to a more peaceful atmosphere in the region.   
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The unification of Germany in 1989 has promoted research to study how Korea 
will be unified. Scholars have predicted three scenarios of a unified Korea: “unification 
through system evolution and integration, unification through collapse and absorption, 
and unification through conflict.”3 Depending on the scenario, they estimated the cost by 
analyzing the various financial factors of Korean unification. In 1991, the Harvard 
Institute for Population and Development argued that $250 billion to $500 billion would 
be needed for the Korean unification based on lessons of German unification.4 After that, 
according to various scenarios and diverse definitions of unification costs, economists 
estimated at $400 billion to $3.6 trillion.5 Kim Jung-un’s regime seems to be a stable 
system, so far, despite the worry of surrounding countries; however, Jang Sung-taek and 
Hyun Young-chul, who was vice chairman of the National Defense Commission of NK 
and minister of North Korean forces, were executed because of treason. While the 
complaints of its military are increasing, the number of its defectors are also increasing. 
Under the U.N. Resolution, NK has lost its friends, such as Libya during the Arab spring 
and Iran in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. With the international pressure and 
increasing domestic dissatisfaction, NK’s fate will be collapse. In addition, considering 
characteristics of modern welfare and the ROK-US alliance, North Korea is less likely to 
start an all-out war. Therefore, this thesis assumes that the two Koreas will unify through 
NK’s collapse and absorption into SK. The literature review focuses on three particular 
literatures—economic statistics, official documents from the Ministry of Unification in 
SK, and scholarly studies. These concern specific unification cost calculations: 
                                                 
3Wolf, “Korean Reunification,” 683–84. 
4Dong-ho Cho, Unification Benefit Is Larger than Unification Cost (Seoul: Institute for Unification 
Education, Seoul: Ministry of Unification in Korea, last updated May 2, 2011), 
http://www.uniedu.go.kr/uniedu/pds/view.do?atclSn=1246&mcd=MC10001222&currPage=2&listScale=2
0&pageScale=10&inDivSet=PDS0000121.  
5Wolf, “Korean Reunification,” 686.  
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definitions of unification costs, unification cost for Korea: manufacturing, the food 
industry, and infrastructure; and benefits of powerful countries. 
1. The Definition of Unification Cost for Korea 
Before estimating how much unification will cost for Korea, it is necessary to 
define unification cost. Many institutions have presented various unification costs since 
they have used different methodologies, scenarios, and dates in their models. According 
to the research of Charles Wolf, Jr., unification cost is defined as “doubling per capita 
income in the North”6 within five years after Korean unification. He insisted that 
doubling per capita income could “work out its own destiny and its own parities and 
disparities between income levels and living standards in the North and the South.”7 In 
addition, this research presents “subsequent capital flows between South and North, and 
between the rest of the world and the North.”8 This macroeconomic approach is helpful 
in estimating the unification cost since Korea will need the help of the international 
community after unification. This estimate, however, does not show the unification cost 
by category. A detailed unification cost is required to devise a unification plan and 
remove confusion after the unification. Furthermore, specific estimates will help guide a 
unified Korean government, like the example of South Korea in the 1970s. In other 
words, cost estimates that are broken down by subject fields will help a unified Korea by 
providing the basis for national reconstruction and give a foundation to increase its 
quality of life. Consequently, this thesis explores the unification cost by focusing on 
manufacturing, food industry, and infrastructure from the microeconomic approach. 
2. Unification Cost for Korea: Manufacturing, Food Industry, and 
Infrastructure 
The microeconomic approach of unification was mostly developed by the 
Ministry of Unification in Korea. In 2011, the agency issued a plan to promote Korea 
                                                 
6Charles Wolf and Kamiljon T. Akramov, North Korean Paradoxes: Circumstances, Costs, and 
Consequences of Korean Unification (Santa Monica: RAND, 2005), 46. 
7Ibid. 
8Ibid., 47.  
 6 
economic community; it assumed that the two Koreas would cooperate to develop their 
economy before unification.9 The plan explained the unification cost in four sectors: 
system integration, market integration, infrastructure integration, and industrial 
reconstructing. For system integration, the government would have several programs: 
industrial standard; taxation and finance; converting to capitalism; constructing 
integration system. For market integration, providing vocational education, subsidizing 
recruitment, and supporting start-up companies would be included. In the field of 
infrastructure integration, the government would support transportation and energy 
installation programs. Lastly, for industrial reconstructing, the government would provide 
subsidies and taxation exemption in manufacturing, agriculture, and fisheries. This plan 
would be meaningful because it would provide specific programs to unify the two 
economies, as well as using a microeconomic approach. It estimated the unification cost 
that government will spend up to $21 billion; it insisted that the cost can reduce through 
cooperation between two Koreas. However, this model does not follow the budget system 
of South Korea; the reality is lacking. Therefore, a research of unification cost is needed 
according to the system of South Korea. 
After 2011, research focusing on government spending began. In 2013, the Korea 
Institute for National Unification (KINU) released a study about unification costs and 
benefits from the perspective of politics, economy, and society.10 Among them, 
economic sectors not only included specific programs—as mentioned before—but also 
followed the budget system of the South. Unlike previous research, KINU researchers 
assumed that the government of a united Korea would spend up to 5% of the gross 
domestic product (GDP) of South Korea for 20 years in total unification costs; it is the 
result derived from the lessons of Germany: “Germany had spent more than 5% of West 
Germany’s GDP since unification in the early 1990s.”11 In addition, the most important 
characteristic of KINU’s thesis is that Korea can use 5% of South Korea’s GDP for two 
                                                 
9KIEP and KIET, Korea Economic Community Promotion Initiative (Seoul: Ministry of Unification, 
2011), chap. 4, http://www.korea.kr/archive/expDocView.do?docId=30610.  
10Cho et al., A Research on the Costs and Benefits of Korean Unification: Political, Social, and 
Economic areas (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2013), 225.    
11Wolf, “Korean Reunification,” 685. 
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decades as its unification cost through reducing defense, decreasing social conflict, and 
developing market. As a result, this research presented sector allocations of the 
unification cost in the economy. While KINU provided a realistic model to unify two 
Koreas, it is plausible for a unified Korea to run into financial difficulties in the process 
of unification. The model, however, do not expect amount of international economic 
support, and it optimistically expects to achieve the unification through changes to Kim’s 
regime. To develop the economy, trans-national corporations (TNCs) and the support of 
powerful countries are necessary for unification. Moreover, in consideration of Kim’s 
recent behaviors, it is not feasible that NK will reform based on system evolution itself. 
Consequently, this thesis follows some of KINU’s assumptions: SK can use 5% of South 
Korea’s GDP for two decades as unification costs; in addition, this research considers the 
international effects of unification from the perspective of the macroeconomic approach.  
3. Benefits of Powerful Countries and the Korean Peninsula 
To unify with North Korea, South Korea needs the help of surrounding powerful 
countries, and two Koreas should be able to persuade powerful countries that have an 
interest in Korea by estimating economic effect on the Koreans and their economy. Many 
studies have focused on this area of research already.  
Charles Wolf said that “unification would entail major security benefits for the 
United States in the form of controlled and then terminated WMD programs in the North 
and elimination of the threat of weapons proliferation to stateless terrorist 
organizations.”12 Through unification, cooperation between the concerned countries will 
increase; there will be an atmosphere of increased reconciliation based on six-party talks 
in the Far East. On the other hand, if the United States, as the leader of the regional 
system, is deeply involved in Korean unification, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
will think of Korean unification as a defeat of Communism. Thus, SK government should 
stress economic benefits for China and get rid of a misunderstanding of PRC’s defeat. As 
one researcher suggested, “international cooperation between the U.S., China, Japan, and 
                                                 
12Ibid., 690. 
 8 
Russia is highly advisable.”13 Considering these potential effects of unification, this 
thesis explores the economic benefits to China as well as the United States.  
As for economic costs, financial support from regional powers, mostly the United 
States and China, will be needed.14 Even though estimated costs are high, the benefits for 
America as well as North Korea will be enormous. The United States can not only 
enlarge its market, but it can also reduce its trade dependence on China while North 
Korea is developing its economy in manufacturing. Marcus Noland presented the benefits 
of unification using computable general equilibrium models (CGE). He argued that trade 
between the area of North Korea and the United States will be expanded about 70 
times.15 Although Noland’s thesis shows the benefits to the United States, he does not 
provide an estimate of how much financial support the United States should offer. To 
determine the suitability of U.S. support and to understand its potential, this thesis 
explores the costs and benefits of unification to the United States. 
For China, Korean unification means two sides of the same coin. In economic 
terms, Kiejoon Pak argued that “a unified Korea would contribute at least an average of 
0.2–0.5% increase in China’s annual GDP.”16 In addition, many others have argued that 
the border region’s economy will grow rapidly through Korean unification.17 On the 
other hand, unification led by South Korea can be seen as defeat of communism. 
Furthermore, according to the spread of capitalism and democracy, China will fear a 
crisis for the communist system and eventually oppose the unification. Consequently, this 
thesis explores how to strategically approach China regarding its support of unification 
and to understand China’s security interests. 
                                                 
13Marcin Grabowski, “Korean Unification Prospects and the United States’ Policy,” Ad American: 
Journal of American Studies 14 (2013): 47, ProQuest (1516048014). 
14Ibid.  
15Marcus Noland, “A Study to Analyze Cost-Benefits of the Reunification of Korean Peninsula to the 
United States” (Seoul: Ministry of Unification, last modified February 16, 2015), 
http://www.unikorea.go.kr/content.do?cmsid=3096&mode=view&page=&cid=42366.  
16Kiejoon Pak, “China’s Cost-Benefit Analysis of a Unified Korea: South Korea’s Strategic 
Approaches,” Journal of East Asian Affairs 26, no. 2 (2012): 45, ProQuest (1322715495).  
17Shannon Tiezzi, “How China Could Benefit from a United Korea,” Diplomat, January 14, 2014, 
http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/how-china-could-benefit-from-a-united-korea.  
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D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
This thesis explores whether South Korea can overcome its economic burden 
based on current economic data. While Germany spent 5% of West Germany’s GDP for 
five years as its unification cost, a unified Korea will not exceed that of South Korea’s 
GDP. Considering the difference between Germany and Korea, this thesis follows the 
KINU’s assumption, which shows that a unified government will spend its unification 
cost for two decades after the unification. Since this thesis assumes that North Korea will 
suddenly collapse and be absorbed by SK, a unified government will suffer a big mess. 
Thus, this model can minimize adverse effects in the early phases of unification and help 
remove the economic fear of Korean unification that comes from studying what happened 
in Germany. As a result, a unified Korea can have confidence and play a leading role in 
the unification. According to Auerbach’s article, “Economic cooperation between the two 
Koreas can alleviate some of the projected burdens. Reforms of South Korea’s fiscal 
policies take on added importance in light of the large added burdens of reunification.”18 
Therefore, this thesis tries to find ways to reduce the unification cost through the example 
of Kaesong Industrial Complex and research by other relevant scholars. 
Korean unification will also influence its neighbor countries. Although the help of 
international societies will be needed in the early period of unification, gains and benefits 
of expanded economic transactions will exceed “the abnormal security hazards and costs 
imposed on the international societies through a divided and unpredictable Korea.”19 
This thesis also shows how unification would affect the United States and China from the 
perspective of security and the economy. 
The main hypothesis of this thesis is that the government of a unified Korea can 
overcome the economic burden in terms of its manufacturing, food industry, and 
infrastructure. The microeconomic approach will guide the government’s preparations 
                                                 
18Alan J. Auerbach, “The Fiscal Burden of Korean Reunification: A Generational Account Approach” 
(Berkeley: University of California, Berkeley, Econometrics Laboratory, 2004), 
http://eml.berkeley.edu/~auerbach/burden2.pdf.  
19Wolf, “Korean Reunification,” 690. 
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and help explain how to efficiently provide public goods. This thesis also explores the 
feasibility of the hypothesis based on the lessons learned from German unification. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The research design assesses the empirical evidence for the four potential 
explanations. This section provides a list of how each of these are tested. 
The first potential explanation is that the government of a unified Korea can cover 
0.25% of South Korea’s GDP over 20 years as the industrial cost of unification, based on 
the KINU’s assumption and the industrial spending of the SK government. Currently, 
South Korea spends about 5% of its GDP in the industrial sector. When the total 
unification cost assumes 5% of South Korea’s GDP, industrial costs are estimated to be 
0.25% of South Korea’s GDP. This explanation is tested by analyzing the example of 
Kaesong Industrial Complex, which is operating 124 South Korean factories in a 
complex employing about 54,060 North Korean workers near the border as of August 
2015.20 Through the establishment of an additional three industrial complexes, the effect 
of this industry will spread through the North. If the industrial cost is not a burden for 
South Korea, Korean unification will be achieved more easily.  
The second potential explanation is that the government of a unified Korea can 
cover 0.25% of South Korea’s GDP over 20 years as the food cost of unification. South 
Korea spends about 5% of its GDP in the agriculture, fish, and food sectors. This 
explanation is tested through a case history assessment of South Korea and through KIEP 
research. Through subsidies of the agricultural and fishery sectors in South Korea, this 
thesis assesses the output and effect of the food sector cost of unification. 
The third potential explanation is that the government of a unified Korea can 
cover 0.5% of South Korea’s GDP over 20 years as the infrastructural cost of unification. 
South Korea spends about 7% of its GDP on infrastructure. Since North Korea has 
outdated infrastructures, this thesis assumes that the infrastructural cost should be 
                                                 
20Kaesong Industrial District Management Committee, “The Enterprise Status,” KIC Web, accessed 
August 21, 2015, https://www.kidmac.com/kor/contents.do?menuNo=100158.    
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increased up to 10% of South Korea’ GDP. This explanation is tested through a case 
history assessment of South Korea in the 1970s and 1980s and through KRIHS research.  
The last potential explanation is that Korean unification will greatly help the 
United States and China in the areas of security and economy. This explanation can be 
tested by assessing how Korean unification would affect the economy and security of the 
United States and China and whether or not the benefits that two powerful countries will 
receive are greater than the costs. It is important to note that the United States will 
provide enormous support to North Korea in exchange for it giving up nuclear weapons. 
China will feel the challenge of security and politics due to the changes occurring in 
North Korea. Consequently, this research explores whether the economic effect for the 
United States is beneficial enough to justify the costs associated with North Korea’s 
ending its WMD weapon programs as laid out in the Iran deal, and analyzes China’s 
security and political gains. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The thesis is organized into five chapters. The first chapter is the introduction, 
which explains the meaning of unification for Koreans and the past research in Korea. 
The second chapter presents an overview of North Korea’s economy and possible 
unification scenarios. The third chapter assesses the unification cost in manufacturing, 
food industry, and infrastructure sectors, and also provides the definition of unification 
cost using a microeconomic approach. The fourth chapter assesses the costs and benefits 
of Korean unification to the United States and China, and the concluding chapter 
describes the implications of Korean unification for powerful countries that have an 
interest in Korea as well as in two Koreas. 
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II. NORTH KOREAN ECONOMY 
Except for NK, all communist countries have tried to remove the inefficiency of a 
planned economy after their nation-building. Within most communist countries, a 
centralized planned economy seems to have accomplished proper production, use 
resources effectively, and solve unemployment; however, planned economies have 
created an inefficient allocation of resources and have eventually led to supply shortages. 
Therefore, like China, which applied some market functions in a planned economy, 
communist countries have changed to a modified market economy. NK, however, 
maintained a centrally planned socialist command system. Despite a severe economic 
crisis in the 1990s, it still adheres to communist principles. For example, Jang Sung-taek, 
who is married to the sister of former NK supreme leader Kim Jong-il and vice chairman 
of the National Defense Commission of NK, established the joint steering committee for 
developing the Rasin Economic Trade Zone and the Hwanggumpyong and Wihwa 
Islands Economic Zone with China. His sudden execution, however, stopped NK’s 
cooperation with China and exacerbated NK’s economic problems. As a result, NK is 
more isolated from the world, and its economic reality is drastically different from the 
paradise which it claims to be. In contrast, SK has achieved outstanding economic 
development in the same period. After the Korean War, SK was one of the poorest 
nations in the world. To achieve better living conditions, South Koreans did their best 
under soft authoritarianism. As a result, they achieved the “Miracle on the Han River” 
and joined the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 
1996. SK’s economy is still growing; therefore, the gap between the two Koreas is 
increasing every year. 
A. PAST ECONOMIC POLICIES 
In the 1960s, NK had promoted the industrialization process under Kim Il-sung. 
Thanks to abundant natural resources and cheap labor, it achieved an economic 
performance that was superior to SK. NK set up three goals that were key to its economic 
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policies: independent national economic construction, a priority on heavy industry 
development, and simultaneous development of the military and economy. 
1. Independent National Economic Construction 
As China’s Chairman Mao did, NK wanted to accomplish an independent 
economic structure using internal resources; it refused to trade despite its comparative 
advantage. According to NK’s dictionary, an independent economic structure means “not 
slaved to others. Based on the resources and power that we hold, economic development 
is activated by itself.”21 In other words, the economy covers the national demand through 
its own procurement, using its own methods of production.  
In the case of China, Mao also argued for independent economic construction in 
the 1950s. Through the Great Leap Forward, he hoped to “speed the advance toward 
socialism.”22 The failure of this movement, however, continued China’s economic 
disaster and famine. In agriculture, “misconceived irrigation projects leached nutrients 
from the soil, and mass mobilization for work projects exhausted and demoralized the 
people.”23 In the industrial sector, “serious mistakes were made because the government 
accepted the exaggerated figures forwarded by overenthusiastic local authorities.”24 
These failures were a reason to change the PRC’s economic strategy, so Deng Xiaoping 
carried out the dual-track strategy to introduce capitalist policies and remove collective 
agriculture.25 
On the other hand, despite a severe economic crisis in the 1990s, NK refused to 
adopt China’s strategy since introducing market elements was contrary to communist 
principles. Until now, the communists of NK argued independent economic construction, 
but an increasingly severe economic crisis and the gap with SK made its economy open a 
                                                 
21Korean Workers’ Party, Economic Dictionary II (Pyongyang: Social Science, 1985), 208.  
22Conrad Schirokauer and Donald Clark, Modern East Asia: A Brief History, 2nd ed. (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 2008), 363. 
23Ibid., 364.   
24Ibid.  
25Loren Brandt, Debin Ma, and Thomas G. Rawski, “From Divergence to Convergence: Reevaluating 
the History behind China’s Economic Boom,” Journal of Economic Literature 52, no. 1 (2014): 96, 
doi:10.1257/jel.52.1.45. 
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little bit. For example, NK established the Rasin-Sunbong Special Economic Zone to 
attract foreign direct investment (FDI) in 1991. In the 2000s, it had expanded the special 
economic zone (SEZ) area to Sinuiju, Kaesong, and Mt. Geumgang. Sinuiju area, 
however, fell through because of non-cooperation from China. The other two were 
carried out by SK’s investment. Jung Ju-young, who is the former chairman of Hyundai 
and comes from NK, invested in two SEZs with the help of progressive SK presidents. 
Although the Mt. Geumgang SEZ was stopped by NK’s shooting at SK civilians, 
Kaesong area has been operating well since its establishment in 2002. 
In 2013, Kim Jung-un promulgated the economic development act, which 
establishes 13 provincial economic zones and one national economic zone.26 Conversely, 
he also argued that its independent economic construction is the only foundation for a 
socialist victory.27 In other words, this paradox means that NK has difficulty in pursuing 
reality and ideality at the same time.  
2. Priority on Heavy Industry Development 
For NK, heavy industry was a foundation of economic development. NK insisted 
that the industrialization of socialism was accomplished by the fast development of heavy 
industry.28 This imbalanced growth strategy was also adopted by other communist states. 
These states pursued rapid production with slogans such as “Catch up with Britain in ten 
years and catch up with the United States in 20 or more years.”29 To achieve rapid 
development, NK’s communist party guided the development of state enterprises and 
forced households to reduce consumption. With the increase in savings, the party 
invested intensively in the defense industry and the production of heavy industry. 
                                                 
26ROK Ministry of Unification, North Korea Understanding (Seoul: Institute for Unification 
Education, 2014), 185.  
27Jae-jun Seo, “Kim Says that We Should Not Depend on Foreign Trade,” News 1 of Korea, March 
31, 2015, http://news1.kr/articles/?2162601.   
28Korean Workers’ Party, Economic Dictionary II, 715–16. 
29Zhihua Shen and Yafeng Xia, Mao and the Sino-Soviet Partnership, 1945–1959: A New History 
(Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2015), 286.  
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NK has also invested more than 70% of its total investment expenditure budget in 
its heavy industry.30 Thanks to its investments, NK achieved better economic growth and 
development than SK until the early 1970s. However, it also suffered from the imbalance 
of industrial structure, like the failure of China. As time passes, NK’s failures in light 
industry and the stagnation of consumption have worsened.  
Heavy industry is closely associated with a state’s economic scale. If there is no 
large market, its ripple effect will be minimal for a long time. In addition, since heavy 
industry requires a lot of money, its failure will affect a country’s economy for a long 
time. In the case of China, the economic impact of the failed Great Leap Forward 
movement has lasted for at least two decades. Consequently, NK’s failure in the heavy 
industry sector has worsened its economy despite some economic policies meant to bring 
about improvements. 
3. Simultaneous Development of the Military and Economy 
Kim Il-sung insisted that the military and the economy should be developed 
simultaneously to overwhelm those of SK and to achieve a self-sustaining security. This 
policy followed that of the U.S.S.R. and China. Despite its small economic size, NK 
chose this policy; as a result, from 1967 to 1971, the military expenditure of NK was 
increased about 30%. While many North Korean people cannot eat three meals a day, NK 
has increased military spending. Despite the shrinking national budget resulting from UN 
resolutions and the economic crisis, NK has strengthened its military power, including 
nuclear power.  
This simultaneous development is one of the causes distorting NK’s economic 
structure. While NK mostly invested in the defense industry under the direction of Kim 
Il-sung’s military first policy, its industrial structure changed to the military-industrial 
model. With the decline of light industry, it is hard to distinguish between the defense 
industry and private industry. For example, NK established small collective factories in 
the provinces to produce weapons and supplies as well as daily goods. More than 300 of 
                                                 
30ROK Ministry of Unification, North Korea Understanding, 190.  
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these small factories were built in NK, and they can be transformed into military factories 
in times of emergency.31  
Since the economic crisis of the 1990s, NK’s defense industry has extended to 
other sectors as well as military in order to obtain additional economic benefits and 
overcome its crisis. Using the power and privilege of the military, the military economy 
has maintained its size because it has managed investment funds, cheap labor, and export 
resources. Thanks to these strong influences, Kim Jung-il gave the military the role of 
normalizing NK’s economy and supporting external activities. NK’s military, however, 
was very corrupt; the lives of ordinary people did not improve. 
4. Implementation of Economic Plans 
Since the 1960s, NK has promoted four economic plans through which to 
transition to perfect communism: first seven-year plan (1961–1970); six-year plan (1971–
1976); second seven-year plan (1978–1984); and third seven-year plan (1987–1993).32 
The plans, however, did not result in the achievement of NK’s economic goals (see Table 
1).  
During the first seven-year plan, NK concentrated on its heavy and defense 
industry. As a result, its industrial gross national product increased about 3.2 times. On 
the other hand, independent economic construction without trade and the policy of 
developing the military and economy simultaneously hindered the achievement of the 
goals originally planned. Therefore, NK could not finish the plan and set up a buffer of 
three years (see Table 1).  
From 1971, NK tried to be innovative in its industrial technology and increase 
capital productivity. Innovating in technology through the introduction of foreign loans 
was a failure since NK could not repay its debt. As NK’s economy grew larger, 
inefficiency was also severe. As a result, NK gave up this plan and set up a buffer of two 
years (see Table 1). 
                                                 
31Kang-taek Lim, Analysis of Economic Effect of NK’s War Industry (Seoul: Korea Institute for 
National Unification, 2000), 70–72. 
32ROK Ministry of Unification, North Korea Understanding, 191  
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In 1978, to achieve a self-reliant economy, modernization, and scientific 
development, NK aimed to accomplish higher production with the help of other 
communist states: the U.S.S.R and China. They, however, had not supported NK’s 
economic development as requested. The continuous economic crisis and food shortages 
were a burden for Kim’s regime. Therefore, during the 1980s, NK promoted the thrift 
movement and sought to improve the quality of life (see Table 1).  
The third seven-year plan was related to a trade promotion with other communist 
states. Because of the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, NK could not execute its 
plan. In addition, from July 1 to July 8, 1989, NK had hosted the 13th World Festival of 
Youth and Students in response to the Seoul Olympics. In the process, it spent a lot of 
money constructing a large gymnasium, apartments, and roads. Consequently, the failing 
economy and declining quality of life of North Korean people were exacerbated (see 
Table 1).  
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Table 1.   Economic Development Plan of NK from 1961–1993 




• Heavy industry 




• Culture revolution 
• National income 
2.7 times 
• Industrial gross 
product 3.2 times 
• Crop yields 6–7 
million tons 
• Industrial gross 3.3 
times 
• Machinery and metal 
growth 18.4% 
• Labor productivity 
147.5% 
• Buffer zone: 3 years 
Six-Year Plan 
(1971–1976) 




• Improving the 
quality of life 
• National income 
1.8 times 
• Industrial gross 
product 2.2 times 
• Crop yields 7–7.5 
million tons 
• National Income 1.7–
1.8 times 
• Industrial gross 2.5 
times 
• Machinery and metal 
growth 19.1% 
• Labor productivity 
155% 




• Self-reliance and 
modernization of 
NK’s economy 
• Expand trade 
• Raise the quality of 
life 
• Thrift movement 
• National income 
1.9 times 
• Industrial gross 
product 2.2 times 
• Crop yields 10 
million tons 
• Industrial gross 2.2 
times 
• Electricity growth 
178% 
• Crop yields 10 
million tons 
• Railway set up 60% 




• Self-reliance and 
modernization of 
NK’s economy 
• Expand trade 
• Innovate technology 
• National income 
1.7 times 
• Industrial gross 
product 1.9 times 
• Agricultural 1.4 
times 
• Industrial gross 1.5 
times 
• Electricity growth 1.3 
times 
• Rural industrial 
growth 1.7 times 
• Buffer zone: 3 years 
Source: ROK Ministry of Unification, North Korea Understanding (Seoul: Institute for 
Unification Education, 2014), 192. 
Similar to the collapse of other communist economies, NK also went through the 
process of slow growth, recession, and crisis. Furthermore, its military-first policy 
distorted industrial structure; as a result, even if it had tried to introduce a few market 
elements, its economy could not have recovered any more.  
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B. ECONOMIC POLICY OF KIM JUNG-UN REGIME 
1. Current Economic Situation 
Since NK remains a closed economy, it is not easy to collect exact data. NK 
intermittently provides information about the economy, so many institutions—including 
the United Nations (UN), Bank of Korea (BOK), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 
and so on—assume that they understand the NK economy based on the limited data given 
to them. In addition, the institutions apply different foreign exchanges; for example, Bank 
of Korea announces the indicators of NK economy in Korean currency. This thesis uses 
the data of BOK because it has provided annual NK statistics, a variety of analytical 
reports, and data to the various agencies.  
a. NK Economic Growth Rates 
After the collapse of communist states in 1989, the economic growth of NK has 
continued its trend of negative growth. Since most factories shut down in the 1990s, NK 
has suffered its worst food crisis. North Koreans called the 1990s the “march of 
hardships.”33  Before the collapse of the U.S.S.R., NK imported oil and raw materials 
from it; as a result, NK’s own productivity deteriorated and was largely dependent on the 
U.S.S.R. After the collapse of the U.S.S.R., NK’s economy collapsed completely. 
Although NK recorded positive growth from 1999, this did not fundamentally solve its 
crisis (see Table 2). 
Table 2.   NK’s Economic Growth Rate from 1990–2014 
90 95 98 99 00 02 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 13 14 
-4.3 -4.4 -0.9 6.1 0.4 1.2 3.8 -1.0 -1.2 3.1 -0.9 -0.5 0.8 1.1 1.0 
Source: Bank of Korea, “Economic Statistics System of Bank of Korea,” accessed 
August 21, 2015, http://ecos.bok.or.kr. Numbers are in percentage. 
                                                 
33Tatiana Gabroussenko, “Calls for Self-Sacrifice in North Korean Creative Writing in the Late 1900s 




NK’s gross national income (GNI) was 34.2 trillion KRW in 2013; this figure was 
just 1/43 of the South. Its gross income per capita was 1.38 million KRW; this number 
was just 1/20 of the South. The economic gap between the two Koreas is increasing every 
year (see Figure 2 and Figure 3).34 
Figure 2.  Increasing the Gap of GNI from 1990–2014 
 
Source: Bank of Korea, “Economic Statistics System of Bank of Korea,” accessed 
August 21, 2015, http://ecos.bok.or.kr. 













90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Year SK's GNI/NK's GNI
SK's GNI/NK's GNI 
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Figure 3.  Increasing the Gap of GNI per Capita from 1990–2014 
 
Source: Bank of Korea, “Economic Statistics System of Bank of Korea,” accessed 
August 21, 2015, http://ecos.bok.or.kr. 
b. Finance of NK 
The main function of NK’s finance is to distribute its resources in planned 
economy, control economic agents, and redistribute its income.35 In the case of 
communist countries, finance’s ratio in their GNPs is high compared with the capitalist 
countries since states operate state-owned enterprises and manage factors related to the 
quality of life, such as health, education, and housing. Among communist countries, 
NK’s figure was high; it was recorded as 90% during 1996–2001 (see Table 3).36  
  
                                                 








90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Year 
SK' GNI per capita/NK's GNI per capita
SK’s GNI per capita/NK’s GNI per capita 
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Table 3.   National Finance of NK from 1990–2014 
 Financial scale 
(in billion $) 
Exchange 
(KRW/$) 
1990 16.6 2.14 
1994 19.2 2.16 
1998 9.1 2.20 
2000 9.6 2.19 
2003 2.2 145 
2005 2.9 140 
2007 3.3 135 
2009 3.6 134 
2010 5.1 101.6 
2011 5.8 98.3 
2012 6.1 101.5 
2013 6.6 99.2 
2014 7.1 98.4 
Source: ROK Ministry of Unification, “North Korea Macroeconomic,” North Korea 
Information Portal, accessed August 22, 2015, http://nkinfo.unikorea.go.kr/nkp/overview 
/nkOverview.do?sumryMenuId=EC208. 
During the food crisis of the 1990s, NK’s budget sharply decreased. In 2014, the 
budget increased up to 7.1 billion dollars, but the budget’s ratio to the GNP was only 
20%. In other words, the function of the planned economy is not operating well. 
Therefore, its national finance depends on a non-planned economy. While some market 
factors are introduced, the authority adds various taxes. Moreover, it squeezes diverse 
public goods and military supplies from its ordinary people.  
c. NK Industrial Structure 
Changes to the industrial structure of NK were different from those of capitalist 
states. Despite its industrialization, the proportion of agriculture maintained about 25%. 
This seems like the results of efforts to resolve the food shortage. In fact, in other 
communist states, the proportion of mining and manufacturing industries has decreased 
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after their food shortages; that of the agriculture and fishing industries increased (see 
Table 4).  
Table 4.   NK’s Industrial Structure from 1960–2013  












29.8 21.2 20.0 30.4 41.9 44.2 46.1 42.9 40.7 41.9 
Source: ROK Ministry of Unification, North Korea Understanding (Seoul: Institute for 
Unification Education, 2014), 199. Numbers are in percentage. 
NK has introduced a few market factors since the 2000s and established some 
SEZs near the border; as a result, mine and manufacturing industries have grown slowly. 
Service and social overhead capital (SOC) sectors are also growing because of 
investments from China and SK. On the other hand, its agriculture proportion is 
decreasing.  
By comparing the two Koreas’ GDPs, it is evident that NK’s industry is about 
1/60 of SK’s industry. NK’s companies are highly inefficient, like in other communist 
countries. Thus, this thesis expects that a unified government will destroy the remnants of 
NK’s economy and restructure its economy based on a new market. 
d. Raw Materials Production 
The reduced production of raw materials in NK has led to a degradation in 
industrial competitiveness. In other words, energy shortages have caused reduced 
operating rates of plants. Because of energy shortages, NK’s production of basic raw 
materials has decreased, and there has been a reduction in intermediate goods, thus 
leading to a reduction in the production of final goods. 
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Since the 1990s, the production of raw materials has decreased. Thanks to the 
economic recovery in the 2000s, NK’s production slightly increased, but it seems to be in 
stagnation again (see Table 5).  
Table 5.   NK’s Raw Materials Production from 1991–2013 (in Million 
Tons)  
 Iron ore Nonferrous metal Steel Cement Fertilizer 
1991 8.2 0.22 3.2 5.2 0.8 
1993 4.8 0.16 1.9 4.0 0.9 
1996 3.4 0.12 1.2 3.8 0.5 
1998 2.9 0.09 0.9 3.2 0.4 
2001 4.2 0.09 1.1 5.2 0.5 
2003 4.4 0.09 1.1 5.5 0.4 
2005 4.9 0.1 1.2 5.9 0.4 
2008 5.3 0.09 1.3 6.4 0.5 
2009 4.9 0.09 1.3 6.1 0.5 
2010 5.1 0.09 1.3 6.3 0.5 
2011 5.2 0.09 1.2 6.5 0.5 
2012 5.2 0.09 1.2 6.4 0.5 
2013 5.5 0.09 1.2 6.6 0.5 
Source: ROK Ministry of Unification, North Korea Understanding (Seoul: Institute for 
Unification Education, 2014), 200. 
e. Energy Production 
The energy shortage is one of the main problems preventing NK from increasing 
the operating rate of its factories and thus recovering its economy.37 Although NK has 
tried to resolve this problem, the results of its efforts have not been reflected in the 
economy. 
During the Cold War, NK imported cheap crude oil from U.S.S.R. After the 
collapse of the U.S.S.R., however, it needed to pay money based on regular market 
prices. Due to a foreign currency shortage, it was difficult for NK to import crude oil. As 
a result, it started to import oil from China. China, however, was also requesting market 
                                                 
37Ibid., 201.    
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prices, so NK has imported a minimal amount of crude oil from China and has suffered 
energy shortages for over two decades (see Table 6). 
As NK could not get the crude oil it requested from China, it focused on 
increasing its own coal production. This production, however, could not recover the 
production levels of 1990. With NK’s industrialization, it has concentrated on the 
production of coal. As a result, it has been difficult to mine coal using only manpower 
anymore. Moreover, the obsolescence of equipment, lack of investments, and limited 
material supply have preventing an increase in coal production. Constant flooding has 
also destroyed its mines.  
The decrease of crude oil and coal caused NK’s electric power shortages. As it 
became worse, NK started to construct small and medium-sized hydroelectric power 
plants in the late 1990s. Since 2000, it has also continued to build medium and large-
sized plants. Therefore, the electric production has slightly increased (see Table 6). 
However, the plants have not worked properly due to the shortage of technology and 
parts. NK has tried to introduce alternative energy, but it is difficult without the help of 
the international community. Thus, to improve its energy production, a unified Korea 
needs to devise a comprehensive energy development plan. 
Table 6.   Energy Supply of NK from 1992–2013 
















24.7 23.1 21.3 17.0 19.4 19.0 20.6 22.5 25.5 23.7 21.5 22.1 
Source: Statistics Korea, Korean Statistical Information Service (database, accessed 




f. Foreign Trade 
The main economic policy of NK has been the development of self-reliance. 
Since the U.S.S.R. provided strategic materials, NK did not feel the need to change this 
policy. After the collapse of the U.S.S.R, however, trade between the two countries 
sharply declined, and NK was left without the support of its trade relationship with the 
U.S.S.R (see Figure 4). 
After 1999, NK’s trade volume grew rapidly (see Figure 4). With the economic 
growth of China, NK has increased trade with China around the border. Establishing 
SEZs is one of the causes of increased trade. The increase in trade, however, has not been 
associated with an economic recovery. Rather, the trade dependence on China has made 
the economy worse, and its trade balance has worsened.  
Figure 4.  Foreign Trade of NK from 1990–2014 (in Billion $) 
 
Source: Bank of Korea, “Economic Statistics System of Bank of Korea,” accessed 
August 21, 2015, http://ecos.bok.or.kr. 
After NK’s provocation to the South in 2002, the battle of Yeonpyeong, trade 





















reasons. First, as China’s has had an increased demand for raw materials, NK has 
exported its underground resources. Second, NK had introduced limited market factors in 
its economic system. Thus, Chinese industrial products have dominated NK’s market. 
Third, because of its provocation against SK, the sanctions of the international 
community have been strong. Therefore, NK has naturally focused on China, and China 
has relied on the support of NK to develop its northeast region, Manchuria.  
Table 7.   NK’s Trade Dependence on China from 1999–2013 
 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Dependence 
(%) 
25.0 32.5 42.8 52.6 67.1 78.5 83.0 89.1 88.3 89.1 
Source: Bank of Korea, “Economic Statistics System of Bank of Korea,” accessed 
August 21, 2015, http://ecos.bok.or.kr. 
The continuous trade deficit is a serious problem for NK. While its economy is 
slowly recovering, the market is sharply expanding. Consequently, Chinese products 
account for most of its market. NK has imported a diverse array of items, from raw 
materials to electronics. Because its industrial competitiveness is very weak, however, 
NK authority has focused on environmental resources, such as mineral, animal, and fish. 
Therefore, a unified government should foster its export industry and radically change its 
industrial structure. 
g. Food Production 
Like the cause of agricultural failure in other communist states, NK has also 
managed collective farms. Although agricultural production did not meet its demand 
every year, food shortages were not a big issue for NK until 1990. This was because it 
had small populations compared with other states and because it received support from 
other communist states. 
On the other hand, because of the reduction of foreign supply, the decrease of 
agricultural commodities production, and constant natural disasters, NK faced a serious 
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food shortage in the 1990s (see Table 8). This period was a hard time for North Koreans; 
they called the 1990s the “march of hardships.”38 
Since 2000, ROK’s fertilizer aid from its Sunshine Policy,39 support from the 
international community, and efforts from NK’s authority have led to an increase in food 
production (see Table 8). Furthermore, Kim’s regime has taken 0.2–0.3 million tons of 
foods from China every year.40 Therefore, its food shortage seems to be solved for the 
present. 
Table 8.   Food Production and Shortages of NK from 1995–2013 (in Million 
Tons) 
 95 97 00 02 04 06 08 10 11 12 13 
Demand 5.3 5.3 5.2 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.4 5.5 5.4 5.4 5.4 
Last Year 
Product 
4.1 3.7 4.2 4.0 4.3 4.5 4.0 4.1 4.3 4.5 4.8 
Shortage 1.2 1.6 1.0 1.4 1.2 1.1 1.4 1.3 1.1 0.9 0.6 
Source: Bank of Korea, “Economic Statistics System of Bank of Korea,” accessed 
August 21, 2015, http://ecos.bok.or.kr. 
Many institutions, however, have raised questions about its food shortage 
problem. This is because there are distortions in the distribution system, severe 
corruption, and a crackdown on the market. In fact, after the currency reform in 
November 30, 2009, food prices sharply increased. Thus, poverty has increased, and the 
authorities are not able to resolve the problem. In fact, although the agricultural shortage 
was recently reduced, the proportion of undernourished Koreans did not sharply decrease. 
According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the UN, 32% of the North 
Korean population is still undernourished.41 
                                                 
38Gabroussenko, “Calls for Self-Sacrifice,” 36. 
39The policy was to soften NK’s attitudes towards SK by supporting economic assistance and 
encouraging conversation between the two Koreas. 
40ROK Ministry of Unification, North Korea Understanding, 205.  
41ESS, “Democratic People’ Republic of Korea: Prevalence of Undernutrition” (Rome: Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, accessed August 21, 2015), 
http://faostat.fao.org/CountryProfiles/Country_Profile/Direct.aspx?lang=en&area=116.  
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After Kim Jung-un took office in 2011, NK adopted incentives to increase 
production in collective farms. Excess production, however, should still be sold to the 
states, and the organization of collective farms has continued operating. If NK does not 
dismantle it, like China, the food problem is expected to continue. Consequently, 
breaking up its collective farms is the first priority for a unified Korea. 
2. Economic Policy of Kim Jung-un 
Kim Jung-un argued that NK should develop the economy and nuclear force 
simultaneously. While following his father’s policy, he thinks that the nuclear force leads 
to economic development as well as scientific advances.  
In 2013, he announced a new economic management system. It contains some 
efforts to improve market efficiency through changing its distribution system and 
national economic plan. In addition, it has expanded the autonomy of state-owned 
enterprises. The most important thing about this system is the change of its distribution of 
excess productions in agriculture and business. It means that excess productions can be 
handled in the market, and the authority concedes its market function to some extent. 
This action may have the purpose of raising productivity through its market function. 
However, it cannot make a significant amount of money since it is ineffective, and people 
do not use official markets because of diverse taxes. Conversely, black markets are 
expanding. 
Without giving up its nuclear weapons, NK cannot achieve economic 
development. Although Kim has received a lot of help from China, international 
sanctions and improving relations between ROK and China are a burden for him. In 
contrast, “Xi has yet to meet Kim Jong-un, nor has Kim been invited to visit China since 
assuming top leadership.”42 The change of relationships with China and NK will 
exacerbate NK’s economic problems. As a result, Kim’s economic policy will fail, and 
NK will expand its SEZs to attract foreign investment.  
                                                 
42Jonathan D. Pollack, “Is Xi Jinping Rethinking Korean Unification?,” presentation at the 3rd Korea 
Research Institute for Security-Brookings Joint Conference, Seoul, Korea, January 20, 2015, 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/presentations/2015/01/20-xi-jinping-korean-unification-pollack.     
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C. CONCLUSION 
The Kim regime has a task of resolving its long-lasting economic crisis. To solve 
the problem, NK should be incorporated into the world market and establish an economic 
development strategy with FDI. Its past failure means that NK’s closed economy and 
brinksmanship are not a good solution anymore. In addition, during the march of 
hardships, large-scale famine took between 200,000 and 3.5 million human lives, and 
human rights also were in danger.43 Nevertheless, the Kim regime has enjoyed luxuries. 
Although NK considers that maintaining its system is the most important value, it cannot 
overcome its economic crisis without an open-door policy. Thus, SK should find a 
method to draw NK into the international community. In the long-term, increasing 
exchanges between the two Koreas would lead to Korean unification. German unification 
demonstrated that well-prepared unification would reduce the unification cost and social 
chaos. In this context, the unification cost would result in a benefit to the SK government; 
the next chapter explores how much unification will cost Korea. 
  
                                                 
43Gabroussenko, “Calls for Self-Sacrifice,” 40. 
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III. KOREAN UNIFICATION COST 
A. RESEARCH METHOD 
Economists have different estimates of the cost of unification. Some economists 
estimate the cost as twice the GDP of NK. This chapter, however, estimates that the cost 
as NK would catch up to the current economic level of SK. Although NK may contribute 
some money toward the unification, NK’s national finances are in very poor shape. Thus, 
NK will not be able to contribute much to the cost of unification, and the budget of a 
unified government will mostly come from South Korea.  
Among the diverse sectors in NK’s economy, this chapter focuses on three 
important elements: manufacturing, the food industry, and infrastructure. These elements 
cannot be privatized in the early unification period. A unified government needs to 
establish these sectors to improve NK’s economy. After German unification in 1989, 
many institutions carried out research on Korean unification based on the lessons of 
German unification; however, they estimated very different unification costs since they 
used different methodologies, scenarios, and data in their models. In the case of 
Germany, it spent more than 5% of West Germany’s GDP in the early 1990s.44 
Therefore, the SK government has also made 5% of its GDP a baseline cost of 
unification. The situation in Korea, however, is a little different: “For example, East 
Germany’s population was about one-quarter that of West Germany in 1990, While NK’s 
population is about one-half that of SK; East Germany’s GDP was about 8–9% of West 
Germany’s, whereas NK’s economy is only between 3% and 5% of SK’s.”45 
Consequently, the unification cost in Korea will be more than expected.  
This chapter uses a microeconomic perspective for estimating the amount of 
money that SK government would be required to pay. Through estimated unification 
costs based on relevant scholarss research and SK’s examples, this chapter explores 
                                                 
44See Jorg Bibow, “The Economic Consequences of German Unification: The Impact of Misguided 
Macroeconomic Policies,” Levy Institute Public Policy Brief no. 67 (2001): 67, 
http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/hili67a.pdf.  
45Charles, “Korean Reunification,” 685.  
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whether the SK government is capable of dealing with unification. Furthermore, this 
chapter explores ways to reduce the cost by looking at past cases in SK. 
B. MICRO APPROACH 
The Ministry of Unification in Korea mostly relies on the microeconomic 
approach to unification. Most reports argue that the two Koreas should cooperate to 
reduce the unification cost before unification occurs. Kim Jung-un, however, has 
followed his father’s senseless policies and sometimes has shown more strident action 
than his father did. Therefore, the possibility of cooperation between the two Koreas is 
low.  
Unification costs can be divided into two parts: investible spending and 
consumption.46 Investible spending is able to directly promote economic growth; 
consumption is used by people to raise the quality of life. For example, investible 
spending includes subsidies of agriculture and industries and the costs of building 
infrastructure; consumption includes the costs of education, welfare, and public 
administration. Based on the German experience, consuming spending did account for a 
large proportion of unification costs. Consuming spending, however, would be decided 
by political debates in the SK’s National Assembly.  
In addition, investible spending is necessary to restore NK’s economy and attract 
FDI in the early stage of unification. The expenditure will rapidly increase NK’s GDP 
and lead to a North Korean boom. Even so, NK people are certain to feel envy and 
jealousy at the development of SK. Thus, efforts to raise the quality of life are important. 
Manufacturing, the food industry, and infrastructure are the foundation for enriching the 
lives of North Koreans, as well as recovering NK’s economy. Furthermore, the 
government can easily attract FDI of multi-national corporations (MNCs) through 
providing a framework for industry. These three elements would lead to the development 
of a service industry. As a result, success in these three elements would have a significant 
                                                 
46Kyuryoon Kim et al., New Approach to the Costs/Benefits of Korean Unification: Adopting 
Comprehensive Research Factors and Seeking Alternatives (Seoul: Korea Institute for National 
Unification, 2011), 18.  
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impact on the success of economic development as well as adapting to the market 
economy in NK.  
C. EXPECTED UNIFICATION TYPE AND SCENARIO 
The unification type is an important factor when defining cost and benefits. After 
Germany’s unification in 1989, East Germany received the benefits of social welfare 
equal to West Germany47; as a result, the unification cost was more than expected. If a 
unified Korea slowly increases its social welfare, it will be able to lighten its economic 
burden. Thus, this thesis suggests restricting North Koreans’ movement to the South in 
the early unification period. Since the labor cost is low in NK, labor-intensive industry 
will be developed; employment will increase. After the unification, labor costs will 
change. South Korean labor cost will be maintained or will rise slightly. Conversely, 
North Korean labor costs will increase every year. Today, North Korean workers’ wages 
are rising about 5% annually in Kaesong Industrial Complex. To slow the rising labor 
costs and decrease the cost of social conflict, a unified government should limit the 
movement between two Koreas except SK businessman in the early unification.  
Unification is likely to come about in one of three basic ways. South Koreans 
hope for peaceful unification based on gradual changes in NK. The SK government has 
also made an effort to achieve a gradual change in NK. Through six-party talks, the 
government seeks to achieve denuclearization of NK. If the negotiation succeeds, NK’s 
opening will be accelerated. The failure of the Agreed Framework in 1994 provided a 
lesson to Seoul. In order to not repeat its failure, international communities as well as 
Seoul are trying to find a peaceful and fundamental solution while leading NK’s change. 
However, some political scholars argue that “NK was cheating both before and after the 
signing of the Agreed Framework.”48 Despite the financial support of the Sunshine 
Policy, Kim’s regime has not changed. Thus, history shows how little interest Kim has 
                                                 
47Cho et al., A Research on the Costs and Benefits, 242. 
48Sue Mi Terry and Max Boot, “The Wrong Lessons from North Korea,” Foreign Affairs, April 22, 
2015, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-korea/2015-04-22/wrong-lessons-north-korea.    
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shown in reform.49 The second scenario is that two Koreas will achieve their unification 
through conflict. For example, NK attacks SK over trivial issues, and the ROK army and 
U.S. forces destroy the NK regime. This is the worst scenario for Koreans. To avoid 
military conflict, it is expected that the two Koreas will cooperate and compromise 
because the second Korean War would be a disaster for everyone, as well as lead to 
Kim’s destruction. The third scenario is also less attractive for Koreans: NK collapses 
and is absorbed by SK. Because of its suffering from economic burdens and social 
pressures, NK is likely to collapse suddenly. This scenario, however, is more feasible 
since Kim Jung-un does not show a will to change NK. Moreover, an increasing number 
of North Korean defectors shows that the complaints of the people are increasing against 
Kim’s regime. Thus, this thesis assumes that unification will be achieved through 
collapse and absorption. 
D. EXPECTED TIME OF UNIFICATION 
Because of SK’s inflation rate, the time of unification is also important. As shown 
in Figure 2, the GNI per capita of South Korea is 21.4 times more than that of North 
Korea in 2014. The gap is increasing every year. As a result, its unification cost will 
increase each year if unification is delayed. 
The Ministry of Unification in SK made a gradual unification scenario in 2011.50 
It explained the unification divided by time of unification: unification in 2020 (short-
type), unification in 2030 (medium-type), and unification in 2040 (long-type). These 
scenarios are based on resolving the nuclear issue and getting more deeply involved 
between the two countries.  
This thesis assumes unification will be accomplished around 2030. Since Kim 
Jung-un safely rules over NK and the North Korean people still do not have the power to 
change, the short-type is not a reasonable scenario. On the other hand, the expected 
                                                 
49Sue Mi Terry, “A Korea Whole and Free,” Foreign Affairs 93, no. 4 (2014), 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2014-05-29/korea-whole-and-free.  
50KIEP and KIET, Korea Economic Community Promotion Initiative, 550. 
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unification cost in 2040 based on current data will make this an inaccurate possibility. 
Therefore, the medium-type is more correct and more possible. 
E. EXPECTED EXPENDITURES OF A UNIFIED KOREA’S 
GOVERNMENT 
1. The Budget System of SK 
Since the SK government will become the main agent of unification based on its 
economic advantage, the government of a unified Korea will follow the budget structure 
of SK.  In 2015, the SK government has spent $343.4 billion—the basic exchange rate is 
1,100 KRW to the dollar, and it spends in 12 divided sectors: research and development 
(R&D); industry; social overhead capital (SOC); agro-fishery market; health, welfare, 
and employment; education; culture, sports, and tourism; environment; military; foreign 
affairs; public order and safety; and public administration (see Table 9).51 R&D, industry, 
SOC, and agro-fishery market can be included in investible spending since these sectors 
tend to support the economic activities directly. In the early stages of economic 
development in SK, these sectors mostly depended on government expenditures since 
private capital could not provide much profit and initial facility costs were large. Today, 
these sectors represent 21% of the total expenditure of SK’s government (see Table 9). 
R&D expenditure, however, will not be necessary for NK during the early unification. 
Therefore, this thesis considers R&D as part of industrial costs.  
                                                 
51ROK Ministry of Strategy and Finance, “The Budget of Korea in 2015,” ROK, accessed March 19, 
2015, http://www.budget.go.kr/front/web/datas/budget2015.do?mode=intro.  
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Table 9.   SK’s Budget in 2015 
 Money 
(in billion $) 
Weight 
(percentage of budget) 
Health, Welfare, and Employment 105.2 30.6 
Education 48.1 14.0 
Culture, Physical, and Tourism 5.5 1.6 
Environment 6.2 1.8 
R&D 17.2 5.0 
Industry, Energy 14.9 4.3 
SOC 22.5 6.6 
Agriculture, Fish, and Food 17.5 5.1 
Defense 34.1 9.9 
Diplomacy and Unification 4.1 1.2 
Public Safety 15.4 4.5 
Public Administration 52.7 15.4 
Total 343.4 100.0 
Source: ROK Ministry of Strategy and Finance, “The Budget of Korea in 2015,”  
ROK, accessed March 19, 2015, http://www.budget.go.kr/front/web/datas 
/budget2015.do?mode=intro.  
2. Investible Funds of a Unified Government 
As Germany invested 5% of West Germany’s GDP while Germany maintained 
financial stability in the early stages of unification, SK would also set up a guideline for 
investing 5% of its GDP. The government can afford the money through a reduction in 
defense spending, a reduction in agricultural and fisheries subsidies, and cost savings in 
social conflict. Korean scholars argue that the two Koreas consumed too much money 
defending the demilitarized zone (DMZ) on defense.52 For example, in 1997, Dong-ho 
Cho gathered data about national income, territory, and populations of 150 countries and 
derived a formula of reasonable military expenditure in the Korean peninsula; he also 
calculated the opportunity costs incurred by dividing the two Koreas. As a result, in 1995, 
the two Koreas wasted $21.8 billion compared to equipping reasonable forces.53 
                                                 
52Dong-ho Cho, The Economic Cost and Benefit of Unification, in Division Cost and Unification Cost 
(Seoul: Korea Institute of National Unification, 1997), 58.  
53Dong-ho Cho, Unification Benefit Is Larger than Unification Costs, 73.  
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In consideration of Germany’s experience and the situation in Korea, it would be 
more effective for Korea to extend support for a period, rather than spending a large 
amount of money in a short time. In doing so, SK would be able to overcome its 
economic burden, and NK would receive stable support for a long time. Therefore, this 
thesis assumes the supporting period to NK to be 20 years.  
In this regard, a unified government will be able to pay $352.5 billion in nominal 
cost in manufacturing and in the food industry for 20 years, which means $163.3 billion 
in real cost. In addition, it will pay $705 billion in nominal costs in infrastructure, which 
means $326.6 billion in real cost. This chapter compares estimates with the SK budget to 
determine what the country can afford. Thus, the results indicate whether ROK can 
overcome the burden that will arise from the unification. 
F. MANUFACTURING 
After the unification, one Korea should focus on the development of 
manufacturing business in order to speed economic growth.54 The manufacturing 
industry can make a profit faster than any other industry. NK’s manufacturing industry 
has outdated equipment; SK’s firms and transnational corporations should establish new 
manufacturing businesses. In addition, a unified Korea should develop trade relations and 
supply energy needed to develop industry. To set up infrastructure, the Kaesong 
Industrial Complex, an investment of $863 million by SK, is a good example to look at 
when estimating cost. In SK, the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy deals with the 
industrial sector, so this thesis uses their estimate.  
1. Analysis of SK’s Industrial Budget 
SK needs to spend a certain amount of money to install a foundation of industry 
in NK; it would spend it based on the current financial system, and NK would also follow 
the system to attract private capital and FDI. Table 10 is an industrial budget outline of 
                                                 
54Moonsung Kang et al., Gradual Economic Integration between South and North Korea and 




SK in 2015; it consists of six programs: industry promotion, finance support, technology 
support, industry general, attracting trade and investment, and developing energy and 
resources. This chapter adds industrial complex support of SOC; thus, SK’s industrial 
budget consists of seven programs in this chapter. 
Table 10.   SK’s Industrial Budget Outline in 2015 
Classification Money (in million $) 
Weight 
(percentage of budget) 
Industry Promotion 7,836.9 49.6 
Finance Support 1,380.7 8.7 
Technology Support 1,122.2 7.1 
Industry General 515 3.2 
Trade Promotion 526.2 3.3 
Develop Energy and Resources 3,612 22.9 
Industrial Complex Support 809.3 5.2 
Total 15,802.3 100.0 
Source: ROK Ministry of Strategy and Finance, “Summary of Budget for FY2015,” 
Seoul: ROK, last modified January 30, 2015, http://www.korea.kr/archive 
/expDocView.do?docId=35932.  
Since SK is an export-oriented industrial country, industry promotion is the most 
important sector. This sector has various programs, and it can be divided into four 
categories: promote the macro economy, encourage business start-ups, technological and 
intellectual property, promote major and new industries (see Table 11). After unification, 
the importance of promoting macro economy and encouraging business start-ups would 
increase, but existing businesses would relatively decrease since SK technology would 
substitute these functions of NK.  
Finance and technology support have programs for small business; these 
programs need to establish an industrial base in NK. Thus, a unified Korea would 
maintain these programs, but various administrations would be needed. Attracting trade 
and investment is very important for a unified Korea since rapid development can reduce 
the unification cost and the budget of SK cannot bear all these costs alone. With the smart 
grid technology of SK, NK can install an electrical grid. Because of the danger of nuclear 
power, NK would use its steep mountains, strong winds, and underground resources. 
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Industrial complex programs should be increased to develop the North. Finally, the 
government should restructure state-owned enterprises in NK. Most enterprises would be 
removed; the government would share handling expenses with the private sector. Some 
of the expense would be charged to private enterprises, but most expenses would be paid 
by the government.  
Table 11.   SK’s Industrial Program 
Classification Program 
Industrial Promotion 
∙ Macro economy    
  promotion 
∙ Make an environment of  
  business start-up 
∙ Promote major industries 
∙ Develop the capability of  
  industrial R&D 
∙ Support traditional market  
  and small business 
∙ Promote new industries 
∙ Local economy promotion 
∙ Attract foreign investment 
∙ Make a foundation of  
  industrial capability 
∙ Promote industrial  
  technology 
∙ Make a foundation of  
  intellectual property 
∙ Provide technology standard 
Finance Support 
∙ Support business start-up 
∙ Support credit guarantee of 
small business  
∙ Support constant  
development of small  
 business 
Technology Support 
∙ Support technical  
development of small  
business 
∙ Support the infrastructure of 
technical development 
Industry General 
∙ Support administration of  
  small business 
∙ Support the Ministry of  
  Knowledge and Economy 
∙ Support total administration 
about intellectual property 
Trade Promotion 
∙ Promote trade 
∙ Support small business to  
  export the items 
∙ Activate exportation 
∙Set up the foundation of 
 marketing 
∙ Trade relief 
Develop Energy and 
Resources 
∙ Develop green-growth 
∙ Develop resources in  
domestic and foreign  
countries 
∙ Make constant energy  
  supply 
∙ Manage nuclear structure 
∙ Safely manage the energy 
∙ Support administration of 
managing radioactive waste 
∙ Support the demand and  
  supply of electricity  
Industrial Complex ∙ Support the entrance road of industrial complex 
∙ Support the local industrial 
base 
Source: National Assembly Budget Office, “The Mid-Term Requirement in Industry and 
Energy,” Seoul: National Assembly of ROK, last modified October 31, 2011, 
http://www.nabo.go.kr/Sub/04Etc/popReport.jsp?funcSUB=view&bid=19&arg_id=3330. 
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In consideration of the above programs, this chapter divided industrial programs 
into three categories: industry promotion, trade promotion, and development of energy 
and resources. Industrial promotion consists of restructuring, establishing industrial 
complex and management, and subsidizing industrial development. 
2. The Money that SK Can Pay in Manufacturing 
As previously stated, a unified Korea will be able to endure 5% of SK’s GDP as a 
total unification cost every year. In 2015, the proportion of the industrial budget in its 
government budget is about 5%. If a unified government adapts the budget system of SK, 
it will spend 0.25% of SK’s GDP in the industry of NK. To calculate the exact money 
that SK can pay, the long-term finance prospect of the National Assembly Budget Office 
in SK is helpful (see Table 12). 




(in billion $) 
Real GDP 
(in billion $) 
Exchange 
(KRW/$) 
2031 4,680.3 2,586.0 770.2 
2032 4,938.8 2,675.3 760.9 
2033 5,210.0 2,767.9 751.8 
2034 5,488.7 2,861.3 742.8 
2035 5,716.1 2,925.4 742.4 
2036 5,947.0 2,989.2 742.0 
2037 6,180.4 3,052.6 741.7 
2038 6,418.2 3,116.3 741.3 
2039 6,659.3 3,180.1 740.9 
2040 6,907.9 3,245.9 740.6 
2041 7,160.6 3,312.2 740.2 
2042 7,412.7 3,376.9 739.8 
2043 7,659.5 3,438.1 739.5 
2044 7,909.9 3,500.1 739.1 
2045 8,160.8 3,561.4 738.7 
2046 8,411.6 3,622.0 738.3 
2047 8,660.2 3,681.0 738.0 
2048 8,907.8 3,739.4 737.6 
2049 9,153.1 3,796.7 737.2 
2050 9,393.9 3,851.7 736.9 
Source: National Assembly Budget Office, “The Long-Term Finance Prospect Analysis,” 
Seoul: National  Assembly of ROK, last modified June 25, 2012, 
http://www.nabo.go.kr/Sub/04Etc/popReport.jsp?funcSUB=view&bid=19&arg_id=3674. 
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A unified Korea can pay $352.5 billion in nominal costs in the industrial sector 
for 20 years, which also means $163.3 billion in real cost.  
3. Expected Unification Cost in Manufacturing 
a. Restructuring State-Owned Enterprises in NK 
There are 554 state-owned enterprises in NK.55 According to Korea Asset 
Management Corporation (KAMCO), there are only about 50 enterprises that makes 
profits or are competitive. Only about 10% of all state-owned enterprises are working 
now. In the case of Germany, 3,600 of a total 13,000 enterprises were liquidated; the 
others were privatized. The German government supported the cost of discarding 
facilities and cleaning up the environment in the liquidation process; it also financially 
supported the privatization process. In the process, Germany spent about 200 billion 
deutsche mark (DM).56 Considering the exchange rate in 1989 ($1 = 1.62DM,)57 it would 
be equal to $123 billion in 1989 dollars. If NK’s 50 enterprises are privatized, a unified 
Korea’s government would spend about $77 million in 1989 dollars. In other words, 
about $150 million would be needed in today’s dollars.58 
b. Construction and Management of an Industrial Complex 
After unification, a unified Korea should establish an industrial complex in the 
area of the Yellow Sea, which provides an ideal location for promoting trade and 
establishing factories. The survey from the Korea Research Institute for Human 
Settlements indicates that Nampo, Sinuiju, and Haeju are favorable cities for 
businessmen to establish industrial complexes.59 These cities can provide accessibility to 
                                                 
55Yi-seop Choi, “NK State-Owned Enterprises Estimates about 554,” Financial Supervisory Service, 
last modified February 28, 2015, 
http://www.fss.or.kr/fss/kr/promo/flash/flash_view.jsp?seqno=43457&no=1309&page=76&s_kind=&s_titl
e=.  
56Thomas Lange and Geoffrey Pugh, The Economics of German Unification (Cheltenham, UK: 
Edward Elgar, 1998), 63–91.  
57See http://www.history.ucsb.edu/faculty/marcuse/projects/currency.htm.   
58See http://www.in2013dollars.com/1989-dollars-in-2014?amount=77000000/  
59National Assembly Budget Office, “Economic Effect of Korean Unification” (Seoul: Ministry of 
Unification, last modified December 22, 2014), 
http://www.unikorea.go.kr/content.do?cmsid=3096&mode=view&page=&cid=42368, 124. 
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the world market, and the large populations in these cities can also provide cheap labor. 
Thus, light industry and manufacturing can be developed in these areas.  
Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), which was established with SK money on the 
border of NK in 2004, is a good example to use to estimate the cost of constructing 
industrial complexes in NK. SK’s government does not provide the exact costs, but 
KRIHS estimated the cost to be $863 million as of April 2013 through data from the 
Ministry of Unification in Korea and a press release.60 Specifically, the government 
invested $506 million in facilities and equipment; it also spent $357 million in 
infrastructure. Based on the example of KIC, KRIHS estimated that it cost SK roughly 
$2.7 billion to establish industrial complexes in Nampo, Sinuiju, and Haeju.61  
In the case of KIC, the SK government has spent about $120 million every year.62 
From this example, a unified Korea would spend about $400 million every year.  
c. Subsidies of Industrial Development 
The SK government has spent about $11 billion yearly to promote industry. In 
consideration of NK’s economic scale and its GDP, it is better for a united Korea to 
increase its subsidies every year. Taking into account 1/60 of SK’s GDP, a unified 
government needs to invest $0.5 billion after unification and increase $0.5 billion every 
year. To match SK’s current economic indicators after two decades, a total $103 billion 
would be needed. 
 
 
                                                 
60Nakgu Yang, “The Closure of the Kaesong Industrial Complex,” Asian Economy, April 29, 2013, 
http://www.asiae.co.kr/news/view.htm?idxno=2013042709333197493.  
61National Assembly Budget Office, “Economic Effect of Korea Unification,” 124. 
62ROK Ministry of Unification, “Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund” (Seoul: Ministry of Unification, 
accessed August 23, 2015), http://www.unikorea.go.kr/content.do?cmsid=3100.   
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d. Subsidies of Trade and Investment 
The SK government has spent $526.2 million to promote trade and investment. 
When calculated in the same way as subsidies of industrial development, a unified 
government would need to invest $25 million in 2031 and increase $25 million every 
year. Thus, $5.25 billion would be needed. 
e. Development and Management in Energy and Resources 
NK has about 20 profitable minerals, including gold, silver, magnesite, and iron. 
The amount of gold in NK is estimated to be up to 698 tons; iron ore is up to 24.7 tons; 
magnesite is up to 3.3 billion tons (see Table 13). According to the data of the NK 
Resource Research Center, the value of underground resources is estimated at $5.8 billion 
in 2013. The value of resources is 24 times that of SK.63 Therefore, if the cheap labor and 
natural resources of NK are combined with the capital of SK, a unified Korea could have 
a highly profitable industry and reduce the rate of importing resources. 
KRIHS estimated $272 million to develop NK’s underground resources.64 It was 
estimated by applying the example of China and SK on the scale of production. 
  
                                                 
63National Assembly Budget Office, “Economic Effect of Korea Unification,” 125. 
64Ibid., 127. 
 46 
Table 13.   NK’s Deposits and Value of Mineral Resources 
Sort Type Criteria Deposit Value (in million $) 
Jewelry 
Gold Metal 698 tons 33,135 
Silver Metal 6,356 tons 5,160 
Total   38,294 
Primary 
Metal 
Iron ore Fe 63.5% 2,467,517  thousand tons 337,581 
Copper Metal 4,235 thousand tons 31,418 
Zinc Metal 27,425  thousand tons 52,574 
Lead Metal 9,988 thousand tons 21,528 
Total   443,101 
Rare 
Metal 
Molybdite Oxide 18,745 tons 448 
Wolframite Wo3 65% 146,016 tons 61 
Nickel Metal 147,638 tons 2,313 
Manganese Metal 2,989 tons 7 
Total   2,829 
Non 
Metal 
Magnesite MgO95% 3,316,937  thousand tons 1,455,538 
Apatite P2O5 30% 
250,738  
thousand tons 54,345 
Fluorite Each Level 15,397  thousand tons 4,956 
Barite Each Level 15,397  thousand tons 3,733 
Flaky Graphite FC 95% 14,596 tons 25,489 
Total   1,544,061 
Energy 
Lignite Each Level 17,947,540 3,033,134 
Anthracite Each Level 4,076,390 688,910 
Total   3,722,044 
Total    5,750,329 
Source: National Assembly Budget Office, “Economic Effect of Korean Unification” 
(Seoul: Ministry of  Unification, last modified December 22, 2014), 
http://www.unikorea.go.kr/content.do?cmsid=3096&mode=view&page=&cid=42368, 
127. 
Today, the SK government is focusing on green-growth, energy resource 
development, and building an energy supply system in energy sectors. In consideration of 
1/60 of SK’s manufacturing GDP, a unified government would invest $200 million and 
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annually increase $200 million for 20 years to match SK’s current economy. Thus, $42 
billion would be needed. 
f. Total Estimated Unification Cost in Manufacturing 
Considering the collapse of North Korean industry, the aforementioned programs 
would not only provide its industrial foundation, but also lead to the sustainable 
development of a unified Korea. The government would need $161.372 billion, based on 
the value of the currency in 2014. In consideration of SK’s expected inflation rate (see 
Table 14), this figure rises to $235.445 billion. Consequently, a unified government 
cannot pay the total estimated industrial costs. About $72 billion would be needed.  
Table 14.   SK’s Expected Inflation Rates from 2015–2030 
 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 
% 2.66 2.5 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.09 2.03 1.97 
Source: National Assembly Budget Office, “The Long-Term Finance Prospect Analysis,” 
Seoul: National Assembly of ROK, last modified June 25, 2012, 
http://www.nabo.go.kr/Sub/04Etc/popReport.jsp?funcSUB=view&bid=19&arg_id=3674. 
4. Specific Distribution Suggestion  
Although industrial unification costs would exceed 0.25% of SK’s GDP, diverse 
cooperation, preparing for the unification, and MNCs’ investments would be able to 
reduce its cost. For cost-effective implementation, this chapter presents a specific 
distribution of manufacturing (see Table 15 and Table 16).  
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Table 15.   Distribution of Industrial Unification Cost from 2031–2050 
Year 
Classification 2031–2035 2036–2040 2041–2050 
Industry Promotion    
  1. Restructuring 0.12 0.03 - 
2. Support Industrial Complex  4.7 2 4 
3. Develop and Maintain Industry 7.5 20 75.5 
Trade Promotion 0.375 1 3.875 
Develop Energy and Resources 3.272 8 31 
Total 15.967 31.03 114.375 
Costs shown are the value of currency in 2014. Numbers are in billion $. 
Table 16.   Distribution of Industrial Unification Cost from 2031–2050 
Year 
Classification 2031–2035 2036–2040 2041–2050 
Industry Promotion    
  1. Restructuring 0.175 0.044  
2. Support Industrial Complex  6.86 2.918 5.836 
3. Develop and Maintain Industry 10.9425 29.18 110.1545 
Trade Promotion 0.5471 1.459 5.654 
Develop Energy and Resources 4.7738 11.672 45.229 
Total 23.2984 45.273 166.8735 
The money which SK can pay 34.5 39.1 89.7 
Shortage amount +11.2016 -6.173 -77.1735 
Costs shown are the value of currency in 2030. Numbers are in billion $. 
The lesson of German unification presents that “in the five years following 
German unification, its government poured $600 billion of public money into developing 
the East. That figure exceeds five percent of German GDP for that same period.”65 In 
consideration of Germany’s costs, a unified government may also spend a lot of money 
beyond what SK can afford to. 
In the early stages of unification, a unified Korea would focus on restructuring 
and reestablishing NK’s industry. If the government efficiently spends its expenditure, it 
would reduce its future economic shortage. From 2041 to 2050, about $77 billion more 
                                                 
65Jonathan L. Schmitz, “The Economic Implications of Korean Unification,” (master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2002), 48, http://hdl.handle.net/10945/5844.  
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would be needed (see Table 16). If there are investments in the private sectors or help 
from the international community, however, Koreans would overcome their economic 
burdens and be able to benefit from unification. Consequently, the government should 
reduce the risk of investment by investigating NK’s environment and providing a detailed 
economic master plan in the early stages of unification. These efforts can reduce its 
future economic shortage; eventually, these can be connected with various investments 
and lead to its economic success. 
5. Government’s Work in Manufacturing 
This chapter explores what the governments of the two Koreas needs to reduce 
the cost in manufacturing. According to aforementioned programs and classifications (see 
Table 15 and Table 16), this chapter deals with restructuring, industrial complexes, 
industrial subsidies, trade, and energy. 
a.  Restructuring 
After unification, restructuring will be a burning issue. Germany dealt with 
restructuring through the creation of the Treuhandanstalt.66 This institution sorted 
nationalized companies of East Germany. If a company could not survive in a market 
economy, it was closed. Many companies were removed, and surviving companies 
became privatized. Then the institution received a lot of subsidies since it wanted to raise 
employment and maintain productivity. North Korea, however, does not have valuable 
companies like East Germany, since it has focused on producing war materials and 
weapons. A unified Korea should spend the money removing war materials and get rid of 
most companies in North Korea. In contrast to East Germany, industrial restructuring can 
have more benefits than giving subsidies. Because of this action, many people may lose 
their jobs. Most companies, however, do not work today, so workers may have other 
jobs. Therefore, this action would have less of an effect on them. Through restructuring, a 
unified Korea would achieve a foundation of industry and a labor market. In the long-
term, the action will be beneficial for the economy to raise industrial competitiveness as 
                                                 
66 Cho et al., A Research on the Costs and Benefits of Korean Unification, 265.   
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well as remove incompetent nationalized companies. Moreover, restructuring can also 
improve economic cooperation between the two Koreas. South Korea has competent 
workers, but does not have many resources, while North Korea has unskilled workers and 
various natural resources.  
b.  Support Industrial Complexes 
Kaesong Industrial Complex is a significant example of establishing an industrial 
complex. This complex represents the reconciliation of South and North, and makes a lot 
of profit using cheap workers on the border. To build an industrial complex, a unified 
government would spend SOC. The private sector would also spend in this area, but it 
would be limited without government support. Consequently, the government would 
build an industrial complex, maximizing its profit and minimizing its danger of 
investment. A city which has a large population and is adjacent to China would be a good 
choice. If an industrial complex is built, a unified Korea will achieve rapid 
industrialization. In the 1970s and 1980s, SK also achieved its economic success using 
this policy. The industrial complex will have a ripple effect on the whole community. The 
success of industry gives society a great deal of money. It can also improve the quality of 
life in NK. To reduce costs, the two Koreas should cooperate before the unification. NK 
should introduce a market system in its economy and adopt a gradual open-door policy, 
such as the Chinese model. SK needs to support money, technology, and international 
support. If NK shows trust and authenticity to the South, Korean unification will be 
realized soon. 
c.  Develop and Maintain Industry 
To promote industry, the government should support business in various ways, 
including through money, technology, and research. A unified government should follow 
the economic model of Japan and German. These countries have developed on the basis 
of small industrial businesses that have outstanding technical skills. On the other hand, 
chaebol leads SK’s economy. A chaebol67 is a front-running man among the market of 
                                                 
67The chaebol are the family-controlled conglomerate of South Korea characterized by connecting 
with SK’s government. 
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finished goods. To promote industry, a unified Korea should develop small industrial 
businesses that have excellent technology.  
Today, there are black markets as well as many traditional markets in NK. The 
government should attract traders to establish normal markets. In the 1960s, South Korea 
had the same situation. Traditional merchants mostly have little money. Consequently, 
the government should improve productivity and efficiency through the modernization of 
markets; it could encourage business start-ups by giving subsidies and removing diverse 
regulations. In this process, the government can lead the development of small industrial 
business with excellent technology. 
d. Trade Promotion 
In early unification, attracting trade and investment will be an important factor to 
overcome economic shortage. A unified Korea will set a high value on trade. In the 
2030s, China will not be a factory to the world anymore. A unified Korea would be 
competitive based on cheap labor and technology to the world market. After unification, 
UN sanctions are automatically removed, and NK can trade with various countries. Based 
on the experience of SK, the government should establish effective trade relationships 
with developed countries. With geographical advantages, China will be the biggest 
trading partner. To achieve rapid industrialization, foreign capital is also a necessary 
factor in NK. Many economic reports already anticipate that a unified Korea will be the 
best investment area. Specifically, China will invest in North Korea. To maintain the 
investment, the government should deregulate, exempt taxation, support additional 
money, and support investment advice for foreigners. In addition, the SK government 
should be responsible for whole economic activity in NK to attract FDI in the early 
unification. Free economic zones can be a way to attract foreign capital. Thus, SK should 
be familiar with the investment inclinations, systems, and environments of developed 
countries as well as China. 
e. Develop Energy and Resources 
Energy is a necessary element to build strong industry. According to recent 
research, NK’s power plant needs renovation rather than destruction since building power 
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plants require too much money.68 Most equipment in power plants will have to be 
replaced. A thermoelectric power plant can be a good option since it can easily be built 
and produce energy. A unified Korea will also build hydroelectric power generation, but 
the installation cost is too high, and it can destroy the environment. In consideration of 
the 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident, Korea should pay close attention to building 
nuclear power plants. Thus, the government should focus on alternative energy for its 
sustainable development after setting up a thermoelectric power plant. In addition to 
power plants, the government has to invest in smart grid, which will take a lot of money. 
The money, however, would be returned to the investor, so the government encourages 
people to invest in smart grid. With an increase in the use of electricity and the 
development of a smart grid, environmental destruction would also be reduced since NK 
does not use coal and trees anymore. As a result, the quality of life would be increased. 
Although NK has developed its resources for a long time, profitability is not good 
since NK lacks skilled workers. Like industry restructuring, most NK resource companies 
should also be removed. A few companies that have profitability would be left. In the 
process, the government should receive the information about resources from the state-
owned enterprises. It is better for a unified government to research the natural resources 
of NK before the unification. If that is not possible, geological research using satellites 
will be helpful for SK’s government to reduce its cost. 
   
                                                 
68Kyung-sul Kim, South Korea and North Korea Energy Cooperation Ways Research (Ulsan, ROK: 
Korea Energy Economics Institute, 2012), 13, 
https://www.nkis.re.kr:4445/researchReport_view.do?otpId=B41001800022429.  
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G. FOOD INDUSTRY 
The continuous food crisis in NK would require a reform of the agriculture sector. 
If this agricultural reform is successful, the food crisis will be solved, since the proportion 
of agricultural production within total production is high. Thus, a unified Korea should 
support NK’s agricultural reform to increase its competitiveness. Moreover, after its 
reform is complete, the government needs to continuously support NK’s agriculture since 
food is a foundation of the state’s industry, and productivity and profitability are low 
compared to other industries. In fact, the SK government spends more money in the food 
sector than in industry.  
From a GDP perspective, NK’s agriculture is about 1/4 of SK’s agriculture.69 Its 
cultivated area, however, is similar to that of SK. Therefore, a unified government should 
focus on increasing its output from the early stage of unification. 
1. Analysis of SK’s Food Budget 
SK has budgeted $17.5 billion in 2015 (see Table 17). Both SK and NK spend a 
large part of their budgets on the agriculture sector. Although the proportion of the self-
sufficiency in rice is high in SK, the others are very low. Due to many federal trade 
agreements (FTAs), SK’s agriculture is facing a crisis. The government is trying to 
increase the quality of agricultural products, so it aims to be competitive in the world’s 
agriculture market. To raise its competitiveness and strengthen food security, the SK 
government supports its agriculture in many ways (see Table 18).  
                                                 
69Bank of Korea, “Economic Statistics System.”  
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Table 17.   SK’s Food Budget in 2015 
Classification Money (in billion $) Weight  (percentage of budget) 
Agriculture 13.2 75.4 
Forestry 1.8 10.3 
Fisheries 1.8 10.3 
Food industry 0.7 4.0 
Total 17.5 100.0 
Source: ROK Ministry of Strategy and Finance, “Summary of Budget for FY2015,” 
Seoul: ROK, last modified  January 30, 2015, 
http://www.korea.kr/archive/expDocView.do?docId=35932.  
Table 18.   SK’s Food Programs 
Classification Programs 
Agriculture 
• Agricultural production based construction 
• Farm management support 
• Grain management 
• Rural economy development and invigoration in urban and 
rural interexchange 
• Agriculture price stability and effectiveness of distribution 
Forestry 
• Climate change response plan and fostering forest resources 
• Protecting forest resources 
• Using forest resources 
Fisheries 
• Fisheries distribution effectiveness 
• Fisheries business promotion 
• Fishery resources management 
• Fishing village development 
Food industry • Food industry development 
Source: National Assembly Budget Office, “The Mid-Term Requirement in Agriculture 
and Fishery,” National Assembly of ROK, last modified August 27, 2012, 
http://www.nabo.go.kr/Sub/04Etc/popReport.jsp?funcSUB=view&bid=19&arg_id=3792. 
Like China’s agricultural reform, NK’s collective farms would be removed. The 
government would support small peasant farmers to make a profit. In the 1970s, 
President Park Jung-hee started the Saemaul Movement. To escape from poverty, the 
president gathered the people’s wisdom and effort into developing their villages through 
competition. Community leaders thought and acted sincerely at first; people worked with 
those leaders and were dedicated to develop their communities. SK’s government 
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encouraged communities to compete, and their excellent outcomes were spread to the 
whole country. As a result, rural communities were developed within a short time, and 
the gap between urban and rural was reduced significantly. A unified government would 
carry out this movement; it would rapidly develop the rural economy. 
In the forestry sector, SK focuses on forestry policy to promote the development 
and protection of both. Since NK’s mountains are devastated severely due to the shortage 
of food,70 however, a unified Korea needs to focus on reforestation programs. 
Furthermore, the proportion of forest in the land is greater than that of SK, so a unified 
government needs to spend more money on reforestation than it does in SK.  
In developing the fishery sector, the government programs are similar to the 
agricultural programs. After the unification, these programs would be also applied in NK. 
According to the successful development of its fishery, the programs would be able to 
adjust. 
Food industry is one of industry sectors that can be established with little money. 
Small private businesses founded by North Koreans may flourish if its economy is 
successful. Also, the food industry needs management and supervision by the 
government due to safety concerns. Thus, a unified government would encourage North 
Koreans to establish their business and also supervise the hygiene and safety of products. 
2. The Money that SK Can Pay in the Food Industry 
The current weight of the food sector in SK would account for 0.25% of SK’s 
GDP. In other words, a unified Korea would spend 5% of its total unification cost on the 
food sector. Based on the long-term financial prospect from the National Assembly 
Budget Office in SK, a unified Korea can pay $352.5 billion in nominal costs in the 
industrial sector for 20 years, which means $163.3 billion in real cost. 
                                                 
70Because of food crisis, North Koreans ate grasses and weeds to make into soup. Peter Foster, “North 




3. Expected Unification Cost in the Food Industry 
a. Agricultural Reforms 
NK’s system based on collective farms should be dismantled, and the family farm 
system, like in SK, would be established. To settle down well, the government needs to 
support NK farmers; for example, by spreading valuable breeds and advanced 
technology, and constructing the farming model complex. KIEP and KIET calculated its 
reform cost in 2010: $150 million.71 The institution assumes the reform is over within 
three years. Like in the example of China, the government of a unified Korea can 
increase its agricultural competitiveness through giving incentives, so it would be able to 
reform its agricultural structure.   
b. Agricultural Initial Development  
Because of poor agricultural infrastructure and its defenseless current situation 
against natural disasters, NK’s agricultural production is always low. Although the 
authority tries to raise its output, its food crisis has continued every year. To normalize its 
agriculture, a unified government should carry out comprehensive agricultural 
development. For example, they could extend irrigation facilities, reinforce work in old 
facilities, and readjust land. 
The National Assembly Budget Office calculated NK’s agricultural initial 
development based on Yeongsan River farmlands in the southwest of ROK. SK invested 
in the area of Yeongsan River to change it to the farmland in 1999. At that time, the 
project cost was about $36,000 per hectare in the preliminary feasibility study of the 
project. When calculating the present value in SK, it is roughly $72,000 per hectare.72 
Since the labor costs of NK are different from those of SK, however, it needs to 
recalculate the cost. In 2014, the average labor cost of Kaesong Industrial Complex was 
about $130 per month. It is about one sixth of SK’s average labor cost. Therefore, in 
consideration of the total agricultural land—1,614,000 ha—the development cost is about 
$74.8 million, as of 2014 (see Table 19).  
                                                 
71KIEP and KIET, Korea Economic Community Promotion Initiative, 269. 
72National Assembly Budget Office, “Economic Effect of Korean Unification,” 119.  
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Table 19.   NK’s Agricultural Initial Development Cost 
Classification Amount (in thousand $) Classification 
Amount 
(in thousand $) 
Purity construction expense 64,356 Measurement and design expense 3,604 
1. Water supply 5,504 1. Data survey 1,352 
2. Irrigation canal 27,545 2. Enforcement design 2,253 
3. Land planning 3,906 Taskmaster expense 5,406 
4. Drainage improvement 6,803 Business management expense 966 
5. Unused area development 10,249 Other expense 142 
6. Conversion to rice paddy 2,889 Environmental effects evaluation expense 393 
7. Farm improvement 6,032 Total 74,870 8. Automatic management 1,427 
Source: National Assembly Budget Office, “Economic Effect of Korean Unification” 
(Seoul: Ministry of  Unification, last modified December 22, 2014), 
http://www.unikorea.go.kr/content.do?cmsid=3096&mode=view&page=&cid=42368, 
118. 
c. Subsidies of Agricultural Sustainable Development 
KIEP presented a food unification cost in 2010. It calculated the cost that NK 
needs to develop sustainable growth, including expanding farmland and supporting stable 
agricultural water. It is estimated that SK needs $12 billion for 10 years from 2030.73 
Moreover, since NK farmland’s area is similar to that of SK—NK has 1,614,000 ha, and 
SK had 1,711,000 ha in 2013—agricultural subsidies would be similar to that of SK 10 
years after unification. Thus, this chapter estimates that a unified government would 
spend $13 billion every year on agricultural development. 
d. Forestry 
Based on examples of forest restoration projects of Gangwon Province in SK, the 
thesis can estimate its restoration cost. Considering NK’s forest area—5,412,800 ha in 
2012—KIEP estimates a unified government needs up to $2 billion from $707 million for 
four years.74 The forest area in NK, however, is decreasing every year due to food crisis. 
                                                 
73KIEP and KIET, Korea Economic Community Promotion Initiative, 541. 
74Ibid., 269.  
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Moreover, SK’s government does not know the exact forest condition; the accuracy of 
this estimate is low. Thus, this thesis can obtain an approximate unification cost through 
the maximum figure of KIEP’s research.  
Although SK’s forest area—7,300,000 ha—is larger than NK’s forest area today, 
NK’s forest area was up to 8,201,000 ha in 1990 before its food crisis. Therefore, this 
thesis expects that a unified government would spend $2 billion every year on forestry. 
e. Fishery 
The fishery sector also needs a similar reform, like its agriculture. To prevent 
illegal fishing of China in the Yellow Sea, the cooperation of two Koreas is essential. 
Based on the precise survey, the government of a unified Korea should establish a fishery 
development plan. In this regard, KIEP argues that the government supports making fish 
farms in NK’s area. Because of cold weather and high latitude, there are diverse cold sea 
fish in the sea of NK. KIEP estimates the cost to make fish farms $20 million.75 
To calculate fishery subsidies, the size of NK’s fishery ground is necessary. Due 
to a shortage of data, however, this thesis uses the maximum catches recorded by NK in 
consideration of NK’s fishery recover. Recently, NK’s fishery is not active because of a 
lack of oil. In 1985, it harvested 1,781,000 tons of fish. This figure is 56% of SK’s fish 
catch in 2014. Thus, a unified government would spend $1 billion every year on the 
fishery sector. 
f. Food Industry 
The support of the food industry easily influences the increase of the quality of 
life. Since North Korean people can start a food business with little money, the 
government’s support can help them adapt to the market economy. KIEP estimates $10 
million as the cost to establish food distribution centers.76 In addition, based on NK’s 
population, a unified government may need to spend $350 million every year on the food 
industry. 




g. Total Estimated Unification Cost in the Food Industry 
The above programs would lay the foundation for raising the quality of life as 
well as increasing food products in NK. A unified government would need $333.2548 
billion based on the value of the currency in 2014. In consideration of expected inflation 
rates, this figure increases up to $486.3 billion. Thus, $323 billion more would be needed. 
The food sector is not easy to attract FDI because of trade barriers and government 
subsidies. To reduce its figure, the two Koreas need to cooperate to develop NK’s food 
products before the unification. In addition, SK needs to reform its financial in food as 
well as agricultural sector. To make competitive products, the government needs to 
improve plant breeding and reform the distribution structure, rather than increasing 
subsidies. Thus, a unified government should encourage its farmhouses to compete in the 
global market in the early stage of unification, rather than giving subsidies. 
4. Specific Distribution Suggestion  
To effectively spend government funds, this chapter suggests specific distribution 
based on estimated food unification cost. 
Table 20.   Distribution of Food Unification Cost from 2031–2050 
Year 
Classification 2031–2035 2036–2040 2041–2050 
Agriculture    
  1. Reforming 0.15 - - 
2. Initial development 0.0748 - - 
3. Subsidies for development 65 65 130 
Forestry 12 10 20 
Fishery 5.02 5 10 
Food industry 1.66 1.65 3.5 
Total 83.9048 81.65 163.5 
Costs shown are the value of currency in 2014. Numbers are in billion $.  
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Table 21.   Distribution Food Unification Cost from 2031–2050 
Year 
Classification 2031–2035 2036–2040 2041–2050 
Agriculture    
  1. Reforming 0.2189 - - 
2. Initial development 0.1091 - - 
3. Subsidies for development 94.835 94.835 189.67 
Forestry 17.508 14.59 29.18 
Fishery 7.3242 7.295 14.59 
Food industry 2.4219 2.4074 5.1065 
Total 122.4171 119.1274 238.5465 
The money which SK can pay 34.5 39.1 89.7 
Shortage amount -87.9171 -80.0274 -148.8465 
Costs shown are the value of currency in 2030. Numbers are in billion $. 
In the early stages of the unification, the reform of NK’s agriculture is needed. 
Because of NK’s cool weather, commercial as well as high-income crops are needed. 
With the help of farm service agency, the government should focus on agricultural 
reform. As time goes on, the necessity of reform would be reduced. On the other hand, 
building production and distribution systems are essential to improve agriculture 
productivity and increase agricultural production. Based on agricultural system reform, 
these goals and efficiency can be achieved by continuing to increase the investment. Due 
to the devastation of NK’s forest, the forestry sector needs to increase its expenditure 
compared with SK’s forestry budget. The proportions of fishery and food industry would 
decrease compared with that of SK’s budget because of the relatively small fish catch and 
population.  
5. Government’s Work in the Food Industry 
Because of the expected high costs of food production during unification, a 
unified government cannot pay the cost if it adopts SK’s agricultural programs. A unified 
government as well as two Koreas should make an effort to reduce its costs before the 
unification. 
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a. Agricultural Reforms 
A unified government needs to raise farmhouses’ income and agricultural 
productivity by spreading advanced agricultural technology and diversifying agricultural 
products. Today, NK’s agricultural policy focuses on growing staple grains, but it would 
be better to concentrate commercial crops to make more profit after the unification. This 
is because it is competitive based on cheap labors in China’s market as well as SK’s 
market. To achieve NK’s structural reform, this chapter suggests some policies. First, the 
government needs to dispatch SK’s prominent agricultural experts to the North. In SK, 
rural development administration (RDA) has a role of extensive agricultural research, 
services, and spreading its technology. Second, the government should support farmers 
by providing agricultural machinery in the early stages of unification. Since North Korea 
has little money, the machinery is necessary for the people to raise productivity. 
Moreover, the government can induce NK’s farms to be competitive while reducing its 
subsidies in the long term. Third, the government has to provide the environment in 
which the rural farms can cheaply and easily borrow money. Through strong financial 
cooperation federations, farmers can make a profit and steadily develop their farming 
while they learn market economy. The aforementioned suggestions may be better if they 
use the automated of agricultural machinery. In other words, the automation will lead to 
the idle rural workers to the cities. As a result, the government can supply enough labor 
forces for the cities’ industries. 
b. Agricultural Development 
Initial development and subsidies are important to raise NK’s agricultural level. 
Although the regime invested in its agricultural improvement, it is inferior when 
compared with SK. First, a unified government needs to prepare a water management 
plan. Due to global warming, the frequency of drought is increasing while frequent 
flooding occurs in the summer. In addition, its precipitation is low compared with SK. 
Thus, water management is essential in the initial development. Second, its land 
readjustment is also needed to improve efficiency. With the dissolution of collective 
farms, the government should redesign its farmland to fit agricultural mechanization. 
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Today, NK has managed its farmland to maximize its output without any plans. Third, 
the government should invest in soil improvement. Using improper fertilizer exacerbated 
its soil quality. Moreover, poor North Koreans have been eating grasses and weeds for 
food;77 as a result, the quality of the soil has deteriorated. 
The SK government needs to change its agricultural strategy to strengthen 
competition if a unified government follows SK’s agricultural budget. Its subsidies, 
which respond to foreign agricultural products due to its FTA, can rather hinder their 
development. Bread improvement, diversification, and global warming research would 
increase their future income.  
Since the agricultural sector is a difficult sector to enter FDI due to the need to 
protect domestic farmhouses, the effort of a unified government is needed. While 
following advanced farming technology and management, the government should lead 
the competitiveness of agriculture in the world market, rather than giving subsidies.  
c. Forestry 
The use of long-term wood fuel and logging without any plans has likely 
exacerbated the forestry problem in NK. The authority, however, could not pay attention 
to its forestry because of the continuous economic crisis, despite frequent flooding. If a 
unified government manages its forestry resources well, it will influence rural economic 
activities as well as develop forestry resources and the tourist industry. 
In the early unification period, the government needs to modify the ownership 
over NK’s forests. Deploying SK’s forest experts, the government should focus on 
erosion control on NK’s mountain and promote an extensive reforestation programs. In 
this regard, the SK government needs technical and seedling support for NK to promote a 
reforestation program from humanitarian assistance before the unification. Moreover, it 
should research and analyze the makeup of the soil through its satellites and humanitarian 
assistance.  
                                                 
77Foster, “North Korea Faces Famine.”   
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d. Fishery 
The fishery sector also requires a level of similar change with the agricultural 
sector. A unified government should provide financial support for fishermen as well as 
technical support in the early unification period, such as national federation of fisheries 
cooperatives. To increase the efficiency of its distribution, the government needs to set up 
diverse distribution and storage facilities by attracting investment. In addition, since 
marine products are related to safety issues, the government should strictly supervise and 
administer its distribution system. 
e. Food Industry 
A unified government should support the food industry sector to increase North 
Korean incomes and adapt the market economy. It will also be necessary to provide 
proper supervision and an inspection system for convenience food, as well as tax and 
funding benefits.  
H. INFRASTRUCTURE 
Focusing on NK’s infrastructure is one of the urgent tasks to achieve rapid 
development. Since its infrastructure is underdeveloped, its development will be a 
foundation for recovering the economy, as well as a key driver of economic resolution. It 
is also essential for the achievement of practical economic integration. Kaesong Industrial 
Complex and initial SK’s development are good examples to estimate the cost of 
developing NK’s infrastructure.  
1. Analysis of SK’s Infrastructure Cost 
Today, the expenditure of SK’s government is largely divided into two parts: 
transportation and logistics, and land and regional development. The transportation and 
logistics sectors include road, rail, urban rail, shipping, air, and logistics. The land and 
regional development sectors include water resources and urban sectors. As shown in 
Table 22, SK’s current expenditures are focused on the transportation and logistics 
sectors, rather than the development sectors. Among the transportation and logistics 
sectors, both road and rail sectors account for a large proportion.  
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Table 22.   SK’s Infrastructure Budget in 2015 
 Amount  
(in billion $) 
Weight  
(percentage of budget) 
Transportation and logistics 18.4 84.8 
Road 8.3 38.2 
Rail 6.1 23.1 
Urban rail 0.6 2.8 
Shipping 1.5 6.9 
Air 0.1 0.5 
Logistics 1.8 8.3 
Land and regional development 3.3 15.2 
Water resources 2.1 9.7 
Region and urban development 1.2 5.5 
Total 21.7 100 
Source: ROK Ministry of Strategy and Finance, “Summary of Budget for FY2015,” 
Seoul: ROK, last modified January 30, 2015, http://www.korea.kr/archive 
/expDocView.do?docId=35932.  
On the other hand, NK’s status quo of infrastructure is very bad compared with 
that of SK. In other words, the government of a unified Korea would spend its budget at 
different proportions. For example, the urban railway sector is not necessary in the early 
unification period. After the unified country is somewhat developed, it would be needed. 
Table 23 presents what SK government provides through its infrastructural programs. 
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Table 23.   SK’s Infrastructural Programs 
Sectors Programs 
Road 
• Highway design and construction 
• Road management and construction 
• The improvement of regional traffic safety  
• Private road construction and management 
Railway 
• KTX(high-speed railroad) construction 
• Railroad construction 
• Railway safety and management 
• Metrorail construction 
Urban 
Railway 
• Subway construction support 
• Light rail construction support 
• Urban railway management support 
Shipping 
• New harbor construction development 
• Major harbor maintenance and redevelopment 
• Port management and marine transportation 
• Marine expert training and management 
Air 
• Air infrastructural development support 
• Air management support 
• Airport construction and management 
Logistics 
• Logistics policy 
• Auto and traffic policy 
• Public transportation development 
• Traffic administration 
Water 
Resources 
• River management and Flood forecast 
• Dam construction and improving flood control capability 
• Water resources policy 
Regional 
Development 
• Regional development 
• Urban Policy 
• Land information management 
Source: National Assembly Budget Office, “The Analysis of 2006 National Budget,” 
Seoul: National Assembly of ROK, last modified October 25, 2005, 
http://www.nabo.go.kr/Sub/04Etc/popReport.jsp?funcSUB=view&bid=19&arg_id=123#. 
2. The Money that SK Can Pay in Infrastructure  
The current weight of infrastructure sector would account for 0.35% of SK’s 
GDP. Considering the infrastructural ripple effect and R&D’s inefficiency, however, this 
chapter suggests that infrastructure cost accounts for 0.5% of SK’s GDP. Based on the 
long-term finance prospect of the National Assembly Budget Office in SK, a unified 
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Korea can pay $705 billion in nominal cost in the infrastructural sector for 20 years, and 
it also means $326.6 billion in real cost. 
3. Expected Unification Cost in Infrastructure 
NK has built its transportation system based on railways, so the rail network is 
relatively developed. The road network, however, is not developed (see Table 24). 
Therefore, a unified government should concentrate its balanced transportation system 
development. Since western NK has a vast flatland and can be a link road to go to China, 
the government would connect the two countries by roads.  
Table 24.   The Comparison of the Two Korea’s Infrastructure in 2013 
Classification SK NK SK/NK 
Total length of roads 106,414 26,114 4.1 
Total length of highway 4,111 727 5.7 
Total length of railway 3,590 5,299 0.7 
Total length of underground railway 616 34 18.1 
Cargo Handling capacity at ports 1,063,669 37,000 28.7 
Number of Airplanes 623 23 27.1 
Road, highway, and railway numbers are in km. Cargo capacity number is in thousand 
tons. Source: Statistics Korea, Korean Statistical Information Service (database, accessed 
August 21, 2015), http://kosis.kr/bukhan/statisticsList/statisticsList_01List.jsp?parentId= 
101_101BUKHANB01.1;101_101BUKHANB01_AA19.2;101_101BUKHANB01_AA1
9.3#SubCont. 
a.  Road Construction 
After the Korean unification, the Seoul-Kaesong-Pyongyang-China axis will be 
the central axis of the North’s growth. The Pyongyang-Nampo axis also has potential. 
Currently, these areas account for a large percentage of the goods transported among 
NK’s total traffic. According to the KRIHS’s research, a unified government would 
spend $14.7 billion for about 4,000 km of new roads and $5.2 billion to modernize about 
3,900 km of existing roads. Overall, about $20 billion would be needed for road 
construction (see Table 25). 
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Table 25.   Expected NK’s Road Construction Business Expenses 
Stretch of Road Kind Length  (in km) 
Amount  
(in million $) 
1 Seoul-Kaesong New 11 175 Kaesong-Pyongyang Repair 162 99 
2 Nampo-Pyongyang Repair 45 27 
3 Pyongyang-Wonsan Expand 150 1,286 Mt.Geumgang-Wonsan Expand 114 977 
4 Hyesan-Samjiyeon Expand 80 396 
5 Sinuiju-Ahnju New 135 2,148 
6 Sokcho-Kosung New 18 286 
7 Kaesong-Haeju New 80 1,273 
8 Kaesong-Incheon New 40.4 805 
9 Pyongyang-Ahnju Expand 120 1,029 
10 
Route 1 (Kaesong-Sinuiju) Repair 194 118 
Route 3 (Pyoungkang-Chosan) Repair 556 339 
Route 5 (Pyoungkang-Kimhyungjik) Repair 542 330 
Route 7 (Kosung-Onsung) Repair 765 466 
Route 31 (Changdo-Kosan) Repair 141 86 
Route 43 (Geumho-Kosung) Repair 119 72 
11 Seoul-Wonsan New 100 1,590 
12 Kimpo-Haeju-Jungju New 289 4,598 
13 Pyongyang belt way New 46 732 
14 Rason-Hunchon New 50 795 
15 Chungjin-Ohnsung New 142 2,226 
16 
Wonsan SEZ roads modernization Expand 10 50 
Dancheon SEZ roads modernization Expand 10 50 
Sinpo SEZ roads modernization Expand 10 50 
Nampo SEZ roads New 10 69 
Rason SEZ roads New 10 69 
Sinuiju SEZ roads New 10 69 
Kaesong SEZ roads New 10 69 
Haeju SEZ roads New 10 69 
Hungnam SEZ roads New 10 69 
17 Institutional improvement Upgrade - 324 
Total amount 20,774 
Source: Sangjun Lee et al., “A Study on the 100 Major Inter-Korean Cooperation Issues 
Focusing on Spatial Development for the Korean Peninsula” (Anyang, Gyeonggi-do: 
Korea Research Institute for Human Settlements, last modified October 31, 2012), 
http://library.krihs.re.kr/upload/publication/s_report/0000061622.pdf.   
To maintain NK’s constructed roads, a unified government would have a similar 
expenditure compared with that of SK after finishing the expected road construction 
shown in Table 25. Consequently, this chapter estimates that the government would 
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spend about $3 billion every year from 2041 to 2050 since NK’s total roads are just 1/3 
of SK’s roads. 
b. Railway Construction 
Although the railway is already installed in many locations, connection with 
various industrial complexes as well as railway modernization are needed. In other 
words, a transcontinental railroad would be constructed in the long-term. According to 
the KRIHS, investment costs would estimate about $17 billion for the installation of 
3,300 km of railway (see Table 26). 
To maintain NK’s total railway, a unified government would expand more than 
the SK government. In consideration of the new railway as well as the existing railroad, 
its maintenance cost would be increased up to two times. Thus, a unified government 
would spend about $12 billion per year as a maintenance cost in mid-unification. 
 69 
Table 26.   Expected NK’s Railway Construction Business Expenses 
Stretch of railway Kind Length  (in km) 
Amount  
(in million $) 
Kaesong SEZ rail New  45 
Rason SEZ rail New  45 
Seoul-Wonsan Modernization 222.8 491 
Seoul-Pyongyang-Sinuiju New 486 7,273 
Rajin-Hongui-Namyang Modernization 155 204 
Sinuiju SEZ rail New  45 
Dandong, Namyang, and Tumen Station Modernization  135 
Kaesong-Pyungsan-Pyongyang Repair 186.4 255 
Rajin-Hunchun New  220 
Nampo SEZ rail New  45 
Dancheon SEZ rail New  45 
Pyongyang-Wonsan-Rason Modernization 781 2,840 
Kangneung-Jejin-Kosung-Wonsan Modernization  2,708 
Nampo-Pyongyang Modernization 15 55 
Chongjin Port rail New  45 
Haeju Port rail New  45 
Shinpo SEZ rail New  45 
Kaesong-Haeju New 100 364 
Technical development for a transcontinental railroad 182 
Pyongsan-Sepo Modernization 141 513 
Hyesan-Samjiyeon Modernization 100 309 
Hamhung SEZ rail New 166.5 605 
Incheon Rail ferry New 367 455 
Hungnam Port railway New  45 
Total amount 17,018 
Source: Sangjun Lee et al., “A Study on the 100 Major Inter-Korean Cooperation Issues 
Focusing on Spatial Development for the Korean Peninsula” (Anyang, Gyeonggi-do: 
Korea Research Institute for Human Settlements, last modified October 31, 2012), 
http://library.krihs.re.kr/upload/publication/s_report/0000061622.pdf.   
c. Harbor Modernization 
To prepare for increased trade, harbor modernization, expansion, and innovation 
are required in NK. In addition, since Rajin port will be a central port for three countries’ 
trade—Korea, China, and Russia—and container terminals will be needed. According to 
the KRIHS, $1.3 billion is needed to modernize a major port of NK (see Table 27). 
In the manufacturing sector, this thesis expects that NK’s economy will catch up 
to the current SK economy approximately 20 years after the unification. Thus, its cargo 
handling capacity will annually increase by 1.18 times. A unified government would 
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invest $75 million in 2031 and increase $75 million every year because of NK’s 
increased cargo handling capacity. As a result, the government would need to spend 
about $15.65 billion for 20 years. 
Table 27.   Expected NK’s Harbor Modernization Business Expenses78 
Port Kind Amount  (in million $) 
Rajin container pier construction  273 
Nampo harbor Modernization 91 
Rajin harbor Modernization 244 
SK main harbor-Nampo harbor connection Open 27 
Sinuiju harbor Modernization 27 
Dancheon harbor Modernization 27 
Wonsan harbor Modernization 182 
Haeju harbor Modernization 91 
Kosung harbor Modernization 27 
Shinpo harbor Modernization 27 
Chungjin harbor Modernization 136 
Hungnam harbor Modernization 91 
Technical standardization about port infrastructure  45 
Total amount 1,290 
Source: Sangjun Lee et al., “A Study on the 100 Major Inter-Korean Cooperation Issues 
Focusing on Spatial Development for the Korean Peninsula” (Anyang, Gyeonggi-do: 
Korea Research Institute for Human Settlements, last modified October 31, 2012), 
http://library.krihs.re.kr/upload/publication/s_report/0000061622.pdf.   
d. Airport Modernization 
Due to the shortage of oil and low demand, private airplanes in NK are extremely 
rare. Except for the Sunan Airport, which was recently renovated in Pyongyang, the 
majority of airport facilities are very underdeveloped. Thanks to its economic 
development, additional airport constructions would be also required. For example, 
Sinuiju, which is located near the border of NK and China, would be a good location. 
Considering its underdeveloped airline industry and inefficiency, a unified government 
would not spend a large amount of money on the airport in the early stages of unification. 
Based on the example of SK’s development, the government would increase its 
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expenditure on airports when NK’s economy began to show growth. Thus, this thesis 
expects that the government would spend some money for the main airport modernization 
in the early unification period, but that the majority of its maintenance cost would be 
consumed in the mid-unification period.  
Won-bae Kim in KRIHS estimated a unified government needs about $130 
million to modernize NK’s main airport (see Table 28). According to the above 
assumption, its maintenance cost would be about $0.55 billion over the 10-years period.  
Table 28.   Expected NK’s Airport Modernization Business Expenses 
Airport Kind Amount  (in million $) 
Sunan airport in Pyongyang Modernization 26 
Ahrang airport in Chungjin Modernization 8 
Wonsan airport Modernization 11 
Sinuiju airport New 85 
Total amount 130 
Source: Won-bae Kim, “Basic Design of Infrastructure Development in the Korean 
Peninsula” (Anyang, Gyeonggi-do: Korea Research Institute for Human Settlements, last 
modified December 20, 2006), 
http://library.krihs.re.kr/upload/publication/publication/2006-43.pdf. 
e. Logistics Development 
During the initial 10 years after the unification, it is not necessary to invest in the 
logistics sector since the investment in other infrastructures and industry sectors is 
expected to have a ripple effect. Thus, this thesis expects that the government would 
spend its logistics expenditure beginning in mid-unification. If NK’s economy catches up 
to that of SK’s, the unification would need up to $11 billion over 10 years. 
f. Water Resources Development 
In 2009, SK president Lee Myung-bak announced the Four River Development 
Plan involving the Han-river, Geum-river, Nakdong-river, and Yeongsan-river. To 
prevent frequent floods and manage water resources, the government invested $20 billion 
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for four year. In the process, 96 reservoirs, five dams, and 16 weirs were installed.79 
Similarly, NK also has four major rivers: Yalu-river, Tumen-river, Yeseong-river, and 
Taedong-river. With SK’s experience and technology, a unified government would be 
able to develop its water resources. Thus, $20 billion would be needed to develop water 
resources for four years, and $2 billion would be needed annually to maintain its facilities 
for 16 years.  
g. Regional Development 
In the 1970s, President Park carried out the Saemaul Movement to decrease the 
gap between urban and rural. To escape from poverty, the whole country participated in 
the movement. The core of the movement is the idea of not living well for me only, but 
living well for my village and for my country. The government supported basic raw 
materials and created competition environment. For a winning county, the government 
gave various benefit, including incentives and tax favors. The government spent about 
$26.9 million every year for 10 years beginning in 1972 (see Table 29).80 Taking into 
account the U.S. inflation rate, this figure means $153 million in 2015.81  
After 10 years of this movement, a unified government would need to spend a 
similar scale expenditure compared with SK to increase the quality of life and eliminate 
inequality. In consideration of the population gap between the two Koreas, the 
government would spend $0.6 billion from beginning in the mid-unification period. 
                                                 
79Jong-Ho Shin et al., “The Four Major Rivers Restoration Project in South Korea,” Proceedings of 
the Institution of Civil Engineers 164, no. 1 (2011): 19, doi:10.1680/cien.2011.164.19.    
80Hun You, “New Rural Budget Design,” The Jibang-haeng Jung 21, no. 229 (1972): 54, 
http://kiss.kstudy.com/journal/thesis_name.asp?tname=kiss2002&key=1774959.   
81See http://intl.econ.cuhk.edu.hk/exchange_rate_regime/index.php?cid=7 and 
http://www.in2013dollars.com/1972-dollars-in-2015?amount=26900000.  
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Table 29.   The 1972 Saemaul Movement Expenses in SK 












villages 4,997 2,683 685 8,365 
Improve roof 312,136 2,506 6,263 1,952 10,722 
Build farm 
road 4,000 km - 1,835 671 2,506 




9,000 380 29 207 616 
Well 




700 villages - 2,632 - 2,632 
Build model 
village 10 villages - 602 50 652 
Total  8,586 14,217 4,085 26,888 
Numbers are in thousand $. Source: Hun You, “New Rural Budget Design,” The Jibang-
haeng Jung 21, no. 229 (1972): 54, http://kiss.kstudy.com/journal 
/thesis_name.asp?tname=kiss2002&key=1774959.  
h. Total Estimated Infrastructure Unification Cost 
The aforementioned programs would provide the foundation for developing the 
whole country as well as industry. The government would need $280.11 billion based on 
the value of the currency in 2014. Considering SK’s expected inflation rate, this figure 
increases up to $408.7 billion. Consequently, a unified government could not pay the 
total estimated infrastructure cost. About $82 billion more would be needed. 
4. Specific Distribution Suggestion 
Although a unified government cannot pay the whole cost of infrastructure alone, 
the shortage would be overcome through transforming NK’s inefficient railway. Table 30 
and Table 31 present a detailed shortage amount.  
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Table 30.   Distribution of Infrastructural Unification Cost from 2031–2050 
Year 
Classification 2031-2035 2036-2040 2041-2050 
Road Construction 10 10 30 
Railway Construction 8.5 8.5 120 
Harbor Modernization 2.425 3 11.525 
Airport Modernization 0.065 0.065 5.5 
Logistics Development - - 11 
Water Resources Development 22 10 20 
Regional Development 0.765 0.765 6 
Total 43.755 32.33 204.025 
Costs shown are the value of currency in 2014. Numbers are in billion $. 
Table 31.   Distribution of Infrastructural Unification Cost 
 
Costs shown are the value of currency in 2030. Numbers are in billion $. 
A unified government is able to deal with the development of infrastructure on its 
own in the early unification. NK’s railway, however, needs to transform its system. If it 
cannot change, the government would need a large amount of money to manage it. 
Today, its train system is very inefficient, and its railway is designed for military 
purposes. To transport military supplies, its system is connected to the north and south, 
rather than east and west. If a unified government innovates its system and removes 
inefficient railways, the infrastructural unification cost would be reduced, and the 
government would be capable of covering its costs.  
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5. Government’s Work in Infrastructure 
Infrastructure has the ability to provide indispensable capital to support and 
promote production activity. Thus, it is also called social overhead capital. In SK, 
infrastructure is a system that is a foundation of production activity, that promotes the 
usefulness of diverse facilities, or that provides life conveniences for people. In other 
words, traffic facilities and land development are staple factors in SK’s infrastructure. 
SK’s infrastructure has the following characters: first, its components cover a 
wide field. It is impossible for the government to manage detailed programs. Thus, public 
enterprises manage whole investment and safety. In addition, the character of investment 
in infrastructure is comprehensive. In other words, the government cannot install only the 
necessary facilities; additional facilities should also be constructed. For example, rest 
areas and service areas should be constructed on the highways. Second, it needs a long 
time to recover its investment because of its comprehensiveness. Third, infrastructure has 
the characteristic of public goods: it provides benefits to unspecified individuals.82  
Because of these characteristics, the role of a unified government is important in 
the early stage of unification. Although it is difficult for the government alone to deal 
with NK’s infrastructure, the government can overcome its economic burden with NK’s 
railway reform while maintaining the current system. The investment in infrastructure 
influences the whole industry, including production and consumption. Moreover, it 
indirectly supports the industrial sectors, so it helps to improve productivity and raise the 
country’s competitiveness. For example, the investment in roads contributes to reducing 
logistics costs, promoting diverse investments, and raising the competitiveness of one’s 
product by decreasing production cost. Therefore, a unified government should pay 
attention to its infrastructural expenditure. 
To develop NK’s economy, Kim’s regime should spend more money on 
infrastructure, considering its ripple effect. However, NK’s investment in infrastructure is 
a great danger to NK, which has a weak economy and isolated systems. Thus, the regime 
should follow China’s economic model of a gradual opening. In addition, before the 
                                                 
82 Cho et al., A Research on the Costs and Benefits of Korean Unification, 334.    
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unification, cooperation between the two Koreas would reduce the risk and provide a 
ripple effect to NK’s whole industry. 
Through the KIC, SK has learned about business activities, establishing 
infrastructure, and treatment of workers in NK. SK businessmen may recognize a 
difference between the two Koreas. Therefore, SK officials need to review these 
experiences and present optimal ways to maximize the balanced growth of NK’s 
economy. In addition, the SK government needs to guarantee businesses’ activities in NK 
in the early unification. Because of the risk of uncertainty, FDIs would not be able to 
easily come to NK. 
On August 25, 2015, there was a meeting of the two Korean high-ranking 
officials. Thank to this meeting, the two Koreas agreed to cooperate in various fields. SK 
should continue to restore the past North–South cooperation projects, as occurred in 
meetings and dialogue in the late 1990s and the early 2000s. These projects, however, 
should not result in activities or projects that maintain Kim’s regime. With precise 
monitoring, the SK government needs to focus on infrastructure construction to raise the 
quality of life in NK. Based on principles and trust, the government must draw Kim’s 
regime into international society while also eliciting economic support and guaranteeing 
its system.  
I. CONCLUSION 
This chapter explores how much the SK government would be required to pay in 
three sectors: manufacturing, the food industry, and infrastructure. To improve NK’s 
economy, the development of these elements are necessary, and they cannot be privatized 
in the early unification. Thus, a unified government’s expenditure in the three areas 
should be efficient and systematic. 
In manufacturing, a unified government could pay its unification cost within its 
budget during the initial five years. According to the development of NK’s economy, 
however, industrial subsidies would increase; as a result, the government’s burden would 
also increase. From the mid-stage of unification, the investment of private enterprises in 
SK and MNCs should be active in order to reduce the economic burden of the 
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government. To attract various investment, a unified government should reform NK’s 
economy through restructuring. Initial successful reform could give various investors 
credit; as a result, the government could overcome its deficit in the late stage of 
unification.  
Since NK has lasted severe food crises, the reform of NK’s agriculture would be 
needed immediately after the unification. With the abolition of collective farms, a unified 
government would contribute to increase its agricultural productivity and profits; 
however, if the government follows SK’s food programs and policies, it would face a 
serious deficit. To increase its agricultural competitiveness, the SK government has 
provided diverse subsidies for farmers. These policies could have a reverse effect on rural 
households in NK. In addition, to protect domestic farmers, the agricultural sector is a 
difficult sector in which to introduce FDI. Consequently, the government should 
encourage farmers to increase competition by disseminating farming technology and 
knowledge, rather than giving subsidies.   
The development of infrastructure would indirectly contribute to different 
industrial development and help to enhance national competition. Thus, in the early 
unification, a unified government would be necessary to increase its expenditure. After 
the end of the Korean War in 1953, NK concentrated on constructing railways to enable a 
stable supply of war materials; however, its railways are inefficient. To accomplish 
balanced growth, a unified government needs to reform its railway system and develop its 
road system to reduce logistical costs. If the government maintains NK’s railway, it 
would be required to pay beyond its budget; however, successful reforms in railway 
would give financial stability to the government. Consequently, the government should 
strive for a transition to the balanced transport system of rail and road. 
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IV. COST AND BENEFIT OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
Since the world is closely connected, Korean unification would have a ripple 
effect throughout the global economy. With SK’s technology, the North’s economy will 
be activated, and a unified Korea may be on par with China and Japan in terms of 
economic indicators. From the United States’ perspective, unification would remove 
WMDs, realize democracy in NK, and reduce trade dependence on China. From the 
Chinese perspective, Korean unification may mean the defeat of communism, but also the 
development of northeastern China, Manchuria. This area would be a logistics center by 
connecting the Eurasian continent and the Pacific Ocean. From the Russian perspective, 
unification can also develop Far East Russia. Energy export expansion, the Siberian 
railway expansion, and gas pipeline expansion would give enormous benefits to the 
Russian economy. From the Japanese perspective, a united Korea may be its rival in the 
global market. Many Japanese, however, think North Korea is the major threat to their 
security. Thanks to Korean unification, the Japanese could banish their fears, such as the 
kidnapping issue, missile tests, and nuclear programs. In addition, the help of the 
Japanese could be a step on the ladder to achieving peace in East Asia. After receiving 
support from the Japanese, Koreans could suppress their long-standing anger toward the 
country. In this regard, Korea and Japan can become good neighbors to each other.  
It is difficult for SK to achieve unification on its own because of the geopolitical 
relationships in East Asia. Thus, to unify with NK, SK needs the help of surrounding 
powerful countries, and the Koreas will be able to persuade these other countries by 
estimating security and economic effects. In effect, the help of surrounding countries will 
give enormous benefits that outweigh the cost of unification. In this context, this chapter 
deals with the two most influential countries to Korea among the four already 
discussed—the United States and China. 
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A. THE NECESSITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY’S HELP 
1. Limitation of a Unified Korea’s Government 
As described in Chapter III, this thesis assumed a unified government would 
follow SK’s budget programs, and it explored NK’s unification cost in manufacturing, 
food industry, and infrastructure. Through researching SK’s experience and citing 
scholars’ research, this thesis found the following results. First, a unified government will 
need a lot of money to develop NK’s industry, but the ROK government will overcome 
this economic burden with the help of MNCs and the private sector. About $72 billion 
will be needed from the international society. Second, if a unified government follows 
SK’s agricultural budget system, it will not be able to adequately manage NK’s 
agriculture. Therefore, the government should lead NK’s agricultural competitiveness by 
spreading agricultural techniques, focusing on high value-added crops, and encouraging 
its diverse agricultural products, rather than giving subsidies. Third, if a unified 
government reforms NK’s railway sector, it will have to deal with NK’s infrastructure 
within its capability. Because of NK’s inefficient and extensive railway, it will take a lot 
of money in infrastructure if a unified government maintains its railway. Therefore, the 
government should reform NK’s railway and build systematic roads immediately after 
the initial unification. In the medium and long term, ship and air capabilities should also 
be developed.  
Since NK has an isolated and closed economic structure, uncertainty is great; 
however, the fact that a unified government cannot cover the unification cost within its 
economic capability produces even more uncertainty. To reduce uncertainty, SK should 
draw on the support of the international community. Its support would not only reduce 
the uncertainty, but would also stabilize NK’s economy. Above all, international efforts 
will promote NK’s change and achieve Korean unification faster than expected.  
2. Development Possibility 
Korean unification will provide  a huge economic benefit to the two Koreas if 
they can overcome their economic burden with the help of the international community. 
On a related note, Marcus Noland analyzed the effects of NK’s economic opening in 
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2000 using Computable General Equilibrium models. According to his arguments, for 
NK, “product market integration would generate large welfare gains, sufficient to end the 
famine.”83 For SK, “the impact of product market integration would be trivial, but the 
impact of factor market integration would be considerable, affecting the composition of 
output, distribution of income, and rate of growth.”84 He presented two integration 
scenarios. “The first scenario is the formation of a customs union that involves the 
elimination of North Korean quantity rationing of trade, the elimination of infra-Korean 
barriers to trade, and the adoption of South Korean tariffs as the common external 
barrier.”85 The second set of simulations is related to various forms of factor market 
integration.86 As a result, to overcome the food crisis, NK has focused on its agricultural 
sector, specifically laborers and resources. Thus, a unified government would need to 
redistribute these individuals and assets to other industries, such as light manufacturing 
and construction.87 
In addition, to reform NK’s economy, FDI and exodus of laborers are necessary. 
Noland insists that “more than $600 inflow and the emigration of two million workers 
would be necessary to reach the per capita income target.”88 These changes would alter 
the composition of output in NK (see Figure 5). External capital inflow would also affect 
the real exchange rate. Although the increase of the real exchange rate negatively 
influences NK’s trade, the total trade volume would most likely significantly increase. 
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Figure 5.  External Capital Inflow Case: Composition of Output Change in 
NK 
 
Source: Marcus Noland, Sherman Robinson, and Tao Wang, “Modeling Korean 
Unification,” Journal of Comparative Economics 28, no. 2 (2000): 400, 
http://torpedo.nrl.navy.mil.libproxy.nps.edu/tu/ps/doc.html?dsn=2140832. 
In the agricultural sectors, land that was used for the low productivity of rice will 
be redistributed. As a result, the outputs of other grains and agriculture will increase. 
According to the industrial development, the unified Korea’s trade volume would 
increase significantly; particularly, the output of light manufactures will show marked 
improvement.  
Economic integration will be accompanied by a reduction in political conflict on 
the Korean peninsula. In his articles, Noland presented the effect of easing political 
tension: 
• We reduced military expenditures in North and South Korea to the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
average of 2.5% of GDP. For South Korea, this peace dividend would be 
relatively minor, less than $300 million. However, for the far more 
militarized North Korea, the impact would be much larger and add another 
10% to GDP on top of the gains from formation of the customs union. In 















normal demand target of 7.8 million metric tons. For the peninsula as a 
whole, the peace dividend would be 0.3% of GDP. Per capita income in 
the North would remain less than a tenth of that in the South under this 
scenario.89 
• Thanks to NK’s vigorous economic activity and reduced threats, the peace 
dividend will also occur among neighboring countries as well as the 
United States. 
B. ESTIMATED BENEFITS FOR THE UNITED STATES 
1. Security  
On July 15, 2015, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action between P5+1, the 
European Union, and Iran was announced. Through the Iran deal, the world moved one 
step closer to fulfilling denuclearization. After the deal was announced, however, “Iran’s 
supreme leader, Ayatollah Khameini, said that Iran would never accept unfettered 
inspection of its military facilities.”90 This statement contains a concerning message that 
Iran may follow NK’s wrong lessons from 1994. Although “the United States and its 
international partners have reached an historic deal that will verifiably prevent Iran from 
obtaining a nuclear weapon,”91 critics argue that this agreement cedes too much military 
and economic power to an untrustworthy state. On the other hand, Korean unification 
will remove these fears and encourage verification procedures under the International 
Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) monitoring.  
The U.S. government argues in Nuclear Posture Review, “The United States is 
committed to renewing and strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the 
global nuclear non-proliferation regime it anchors to cope with the challenges of non-
compliance and of the growth of nuclear power.”92 Specifically, it has tried to encourage 
the nonproliferation regime by reversing the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran, 
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strengthening IAEA safeguards, creating consequences for non-compliance, impeding 
sensitive nuclear trade, and promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy without 
increasing proliferation risks.93 The denuclearization of the Korean peninsula would 
match with the goal of the United States. Although nuclear programs can be attractive for 
a unified Korea to increase its security, the government will give them up considering the 
cost of nuclear development. 
NK joined the Biological Weapons Convention in March 13, 1987, but it has still 
developed biological weapons. SK’s Defense White Paper said that NK’s “military 
turned to the development of biological weapons according to Kim Il-sung’s directive 
that ‘poisonous gas and bacteria can be used effectively in war in the 1980s.’”94 
Moreover, a Russian intelligence report from the early 1990s and the testimony from 
North Korean defectors apparently presents that NK has been or could be developing 
various biological agents.95 
Since these weapons are able to destroy society, the United States has tried to 
prevent their spread. In November 1969, President Nixon announced that the United 
States discontinued its biological weapons program and ended its research for their 
development. The control of biological weapons, however, is difficult for the United 
States and its allies. Through the example of Aum Shinrikyo, we know that the effort to 
prevent biological terrorism is not easy. The multi-use nature of biotechnology is the 
primary obstacle. Furthermore, “biological weapon programs are easier to hide than most 
military programs because they can be developed in a university setting or hidden within 
efforts to develop related vaccines.”96 It is also hard to distinguish their offensive and 
defensive applications. Because of these issues, and since terrorists sent the anthrax 
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letters to media outlets and Senate offices in the United States in 2001,97 the United 
States is determined to prevent the biological attacks. To eradicate biological attacks, the 
United States and its allies require continued international cooperation. Thanks to Korean 
unification, North Korea, which has the third largest biological weapons in the world, 
may eradicate its weapons and achieve international objectives. 
According to the defense white paper of SK, “North Korea began producing 
chemical weapons in the 1980s and it is estimated that it has about 2,500 to 5,000 tons in 
stock.”98 Through Korean unification, the international community as well as the United 
States can remove the fear of chemical weapons. “In May 1991, President Bush 
committed the U.S to destroy all chemical weapons and to renounce the right to chemical 
weapon retaliation.”99 Lastly, the “20-year history of U.S. chemical weapons destruction, 
with almost 22,000 metric tons of deadly agents safely eliminated, illustrates well the 
deep commitment of the United States to abolish its Cold War arsenal.”100 In addition, 
the United States and its allies destroyed hundreds of bombs and artillery rounds filled 
with deadly mustard agent with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical 
Weapons (OPCW) in Libya. The removal of NK’s chemical weapons will increase the 
world’s security, and a unified Korean government will be more likely to cooperate and 
make a commitment to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) nonproliferation. 
2. Economy  
After the unification, Marcus Noland argues that the commodity trade volume 
between the United States and NK would be about $370 million (see Table 32). Overall, 
he expects NK’s trade volume would increase eight times its current volume (see Table 
32). 
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Table 32.   Korean Unification Effect of NK’s Trade Partners 
 Real Natural Trade Model CGE Model (Matured NK’s economy) 





SK 1,963.19 50,278.70 25.6 132,492.30 67.5 
China 6,160.65 12,638.47 2.1 33,304.35 5.4 
Japan 0 2,781.36 N/A 7,329.33 N/A 
U.S. 13.13 364.76 27.8 961.20 73.2 
Russia 74.33 289.23 3.9 762,18 10.3 
Total world 
trade 8,905.47 67,589.66 7.6 178,109.40 20.0 
Numbers are in million $. Source: Marcus Noland, “A Study to Analyze Cost-Benefits of 
the Reunification of Korean Peninsula to the United States” (Seoul: Ministry of 
Unification, last modified February 16, 2015), http://www.unikorea.go.kr 
/content.do?cmsid=3096&mode=view&page=&cid=42366. 
NK’s trade volume would increase with the abolition of the UN resolution. Based 
on this comparative advantage, resources would be redistributed, and NK’s income 
would greatly increase. With the development of NK’s economy, its trade with the 
United States would reach about $1 billion. Considering the comparative advantage of 
the United States, NK would export light manufactures. Noland expects that the volume 
would be from $370 million to $1 billion.101 In contrast, NK would import grains, capital 
goods, and intermediate goods from the United States. For example, Apple makes 
iPhones in China because it can reduce production costs with cheap labor; similarly, U.S. 
corporations would be able to use cheap labor in North Korea. In addition, NK’s mining 
is also a good source for the production of electronics.  
Marcus Noland also expects that NK’s service trade with the United States would 
be up to $430 million.102 The United States would export business and professional 
services; NK would export traveling and tourism services to the United States. Thanks to 
Korean unification, increasing attention would generate a larger tourism income. It is 
                                                 




likely that about 1.1 million Korean Americans103 would visit a unified Korea at least 
once. 
In sum, after Korean unification, NK’s commodity trade volume with the United 
States would expand to approximately one billion dollars, and its service trade would be 
an additional $430 million annually. Although the unification could require a lot of 
money, the United States would play a crucial role through international organizations. 
The fiscal situation of the United States’ government would influence the amount of its 
support toward NK, but the investment of U.S. private sectors can also affect NK’s 
support. They can transfer advanced technological skills, build a system providing global 
distribution networks, and provide a successful market campaign for NK in the global 
market. Consequently, NK could not only develop its industry and economy, but also 
remove its past negative image or memory. 
C. ESTIMATED BENEFITS FOR CHINA 
Today, China has a great influence over the Korean peninsula. In response to 
President Park’s request, “Xi Jinping has repeatedly advocated an evolutionary approach 
to unification, thereby rejecting any abrupt or riskier strategies.”104 For China, the status 
quo of the Korean peninsula is a major obstacle to the development of Northeast China. 
Consequently, China advocates peaceful Korean unification; for example, if NK opens its 
closed doors, this would promotes reforms and open market policies. The recalcitrant 
regime in NK, however, has sometimes ignored the advice of China and argues for 
socialism of its own, the Juche ideology. Since there is no attractive alternative, 
moreover, China has maintained the status quo policy towards the two Koreas; however, 
in the unification process, a proactive role by China may provide an opportunity to 
increase the status of China in Asia. 
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1. Security  
The Korean peninsula is a place where marine forces and continental forces 
concentrate and collide. Historically, when there are two forces, the one that occupies the 
Korean peninsula has had a strategic advantage compared with the one that does not. 
Consequently, China perceives it as a buffer zone for protecting its forces. In modern 
Asian history, the areas surrounding China, including the Korean peninsula, have had a 
significant influence on Chinese national interests. Until now, the conflict on the Korean 
peninsula has been a burden to China, and China has increased its armaments to deal with 
it. NK’s nuclear programs justified the Asian strategy of the United States, it but also 
provided a reason for Japan’s military normalization. As a result, the triple alliance—
United States, ROK, and Japan—is a big threat to China because of the U.S. policy of 
containment. In addition, an unstable situation on the Korean peninsula can also affect 
other regions of China. Since China consists of 55 ethnic groups, any external threats 
could have a significant effect on its internal political environment. 
If Korean unification is achieved, the intervention of neighboring powerful 
countries would be reduced in the two Koreas. A peaceful atmosphere and a mood of 
reconciliation would reduce the geopolitical value of the Korean peninsula. In contrast, 
its geoeconomic value would increase. With enormous investment, the cooperation of the 
international community would bring stability to the region; as a result, China could be 
provided with a good environment for performing a local strategy based on its 
geographical proximity in Northeast Asia. In this regard, China would be able to expand 
its influence in East Asia. 
Since the Tiananmen crackdown in 1989, Chinese leaders have stressed its 
historical humiliation between 1895 and 1945 and recent outstanding economic 
development; the Chinese see that they need to combine domestic forces together to 
prevent a repetition of that humiliation. While the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is 
stressing economic development and its humiliation, its efforts is the power to maintain 
the CCP’s regime, not the ideology of socialism. Thus, the economic benefits of Korean 
unification for China could attract Chinese support. As a result, changes in the security 
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environment would provide a favorable opportunity for the CCP, and China could 
achieve its local strategic goals with geographical advantages. 
2. Economy  
Northeastern China would get an economic benefit from Korean unification. 
Economists expect the development of transportation logistics in the area since the 
Eurasian continent and the Pacific Ocean would be connected. By constructing a railway 
from west to east in the peninsula, northeastern China’s access to the Pacific becomes 
possible; as a result, it would further China’s economic development. In addition, if 
Korea and Japan build an undersea tunnel between the two countries, logistics would 
increase significantly; the ripple effect would be tremendous. “Some economists forecast 
that a unified Korea would contribute at least an average of 0.2–0.5% increase in China’s 
annual GDP. Based on the 2011 figures, the annual economic benefit is expected to be a 
minimum of $14.6 billion to $36.5 billion, which is a sizable contribution to the state.”105 
Thanks to various FDI in NK, the northeast of China would also get a huge 
market-opening effect. “Economic effects engendered from increased openness of the 
three provinces of northeast China due to Korean unification will be considerable. 
Increased openness of the three northeast Chinese provinces by itself is expected to 
generate economic benefits of about 283.6 billion (RMB).”106 In addition, if NK carries 
out a wholesale opening up of its economy, the investment in Liaoning, Jilin, and 
Heilongjiang province, which are northeast Chinese provinces, would also increase. Jin 
Jingi, who is deputy director of the Korean Research Center at Beijing University, argues 
that the GDP of the three northeast Chinese provinces would achieve about 51 billion 
RMB, their export would increase up to $992 million, and retail consumer goods would 
be nearly 36 billion RMB if FDI in three provinces rises by 1% in 2020.107 
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In Northeast Asia, there is no economic cooperation organization, such as the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and Association of South East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN). China also hopes to establish of such organizations to maximize its 
development. Although there are economic superpowers around it, China has not had 
enough economic effect because of historical conflicts and maritime disputes. Northeast 
Asia is one of the concentrated areas of capital, technique, resources, and populations. If 
three countries establish an international cooperation organization, the effect would be 
tremendous. By creating a peaceful atmosphere, Korean unification provides an 
opportunity for China to build economic cooperation and also provides the foundation for 
correcting regional imbalances in China. 
D. SUGGESTIONS FOR ROK TO ACHIEVE THE UNIFICATION  
1. The United States 
According to Noland, “the United States has a strong economic and political 
interest in seeing Korea unification as a democratic capitalist state. The specifics of U.S. 
interests and involvement in unification are partly contingent on scenario.”108 Excepting 
unification through military conflict, however, Korean unification would have a positive 
impact on the United States. Consequently, SK needs to frequently mention the need for 
the unification and work to gain the United States’ support. 
In the alliance, states can improve their security through their military 
cooperation, but they should also sacrifice some degree of autonomy in their policy. In 
other words, there is an exchange relationship between security and autonomy. Because 
of the nature of this relationship, SK sometimes suffers an alliance dilemma. Glenn H. 
Snyder presented the security dilemma in alliance politics. Since alliances are never 
absolutely firm in a multipolar system or international anarchy, “the fear of being 
abandoned by one’s ally is ever-present.”109 On the other hand, because of the alliance, 
states have the risk of entrapment which “means being dragged into a conflict over an 
                                                 
108Noland, “A Study to Analyze Cost-Benefits of the Reunification of Korean Peninsula to the United 
States,” 144.  
109Glenn H. Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” World Politics 36, no. 4 (1984): 
466, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010183.   
 91 
ally’s interests that one does not share, or shares only partially.”110 The risks of 
abandonment and entrapment are inversely moving. In other words, reducing one 
increases the other. This causes an alliance dilemma. According to Snyder’s theory, “the 
more dependent a state is, the more likely it is that the costs and risks of abandonment 
will outweigh the costs and risks of entrapment.”111 
In the case of Korean unification, the action of SK to gain the support of China 
can sometimes raise the risk of abandonment. To minimize the dilemma, Snyder suggests 
that two countries should be closely linked by strategic interests. The ROK, the more 
dependent state, needs to match its strategic interests with that of the United States. In 
addition, “a vague or ambiguous agreement tends to maximize fears of abandonment; an 
explicit one minimizes such worries.”112 Thus, through continuous dialogue, 
compromise, and explicit agreement, the ROK should persuade the United States and be 
proactive in unification. 
2. China 
China has a concern that a unified Korea will put forth a thoroughly pro-
American policy. Moreover, territorial dispute and historical conflict between China and 
Korea would also be potential conflict factors. In this regard, Korea needs to take a 
neutral attitude. While attracting China’s support about Korean unification, it should 
beware of the alliance dilemma with the United States.  
President Park attended China’s WWII 70th anniversary parade on September 3, 
2015. Xi Jinping praised Park’s effort to improve the relationship. He said, “the Korea-
China relationship has become the best-ever national relationship in history.”113 As 
evidence, he pointed out the free trade agreement between China and South Korea, as 
well as Seoul’s decision to join the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
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(AIIB).114 To change Pyongyang’s attitude, Park has sought closer cooperation with 
China since China has a big influence on NK. In this regard, SK’s efforts can continue a 
desirable cooperation. To maximize the result of its efforts, the two countries should have 
continuous economic exchanges with NK. For example, the establishment of many SEZs 
would promote a change in NK. In the case of NK’s nuclear issues, moreover, China’s 
cooperation is also essential to urge NK to return to the negotiation table. With the UN 
resolution, the six-party talks should prepare a package of incentives for NK to give up its 
nuclear development program, like the Iran deal. 
From the Korean perspective, China is not only a neighbor country, but also one 
of the most influential countries. As Korean unification affects China’s positive national 
interests in terms of strategy, economy, and security, Korea may be able to attract 
China’s support. Since NK’s sudden collapse or a military conflict of the two Koreas 
would lead to a serious crisis in China, however, China would only support a peaceful 
unification. Therefore, the ROK government needs to stress peaceful unification plan and 
should lead NK to join the international community through the promotion of a 
sustainable relationship with China. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Powerful countries have “a strong economic and political interest in seeing Korea 
unified.”115 To unify with NK, the ROK government needs their help, and the two 
Koreas will be able to persuade them by estimating security and economic effects. The 
United States supports the idea that a unified Korea would be a democratic capitalist 
state.116 If the unification is accomplished, the trade between the United States and NK 
would increase up to “approximately $1 billion, with a possible additional $300–425 
million in services trade.”117 In addition, the United States could peacefully remove 
WMDs and nuclear programs in NK.  
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In the unification process, the U.S. government could shoulder Korean unification 
costs to achieve nonproliferation, but the investment of U.S. firms would be a more 
effective and realistic solution, since the financial assistance of the United States could be 
a burden for the U.S. government and because the budget of a unified Korean 
government could bear the unification cost through its food industry and infrastructure. 
Since the government could not overcome the unification cost through manufacturing, it 
is better to support finance, technology, and the international marketing program from 
private sectors. 
Since it is the most supportive country to NK, China holds the key to achieve 
Korean unification. The aforementioned security and economic benefits for China would 
be able to attract China’s support of Korean unification. From a geopolitical perspective, 
a peaceful atmosphere of unification would reduce the danger of military conflicts in East 
Asia. Since an investment is required to create a safer environment on the Korean 
peninsula, the geopolitical conflict would reduce. Conversely, the geoeconomic value 
would increase: “China’s expected benefit from business cooperation and investments 
with a unified Korea would be far greater than its incremental cost from the increased 
military deployment along the border after unification.”118 In addition, according to Jin 
Jingi, the GDP of the three northeast Chinese provinces would achieve about 51 million 
RMB, their export would increase up to $992 million, and retail consumer goods would 
be nearly 36 billion RMB if FDI in three provinces rises by 1% in 2020.119 
In March 2014, President Park laid out a concrete roadmap of SK’s unification 
agenda at the former East German city of Dresden. She proposed “‘humanity, co-
prosperity, and integration’ of the two Koreas”120 to NK. Under her humanitarian 
agenda, she made a proposal including the regularization of the family reunions between 
the two Koreas, an establishment of systems to promote co-prosperity of the two Koreas, 
and the promotion of inter-Korean projects, such as SK’s infrastructure-building 
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investments.121 These contents are similar with the One-China policy toward Taiwan. 
Chinese policies for peaceful unification stressed economic ties, improving relations, and 
an unstinting commitment. In this regard, President Xi agreed with her Dresden 
declaration despite the NK’s opposition. Consequently, the ROK government can 
persuade China to achieve peaceful Korean unification by stressing its appropriateness 
and its benefits for China. 
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V. CONCLUSION  
Koreans wish for the unification of the two Koreas; they even sing a song of 
unification when they are children. Many Koreans, however, have changed their mind 
because of the economic burden of unification. Through two economic crises, the 1997 
Asian financial crisis and the 2008 global recession, they have considered economic 
abundance as a high priority; as a result, many South Koreans hesitate to support 
unification. Many German people have said that peace and freedom cannot be calculated 
in financial costs. Although the two Koreas have a common ethnicity, cultural 
experience, and historical justice, the relationship between them has been aggravated 
over the past 70 years. 
During the march of hardships in the 1990s, large-scale famine took between 
200,000 and 3.5 million human lives, and human rights were also in danger.122 Without 
policies to deliver sustained economic growth, the living environment in NK will not 
improve; however, NK has maintained its ideology and its tight foreign policy to preserve 
its regime. As a result, the human rights and economic situation are disastrous in NK. In 
addition, differences between the two Koreas have increased since the Korean War. As 
time goes by, their culture, thought, and lifestyle have become increasingly different. In 
this regard, Korean unification could unify the characteristics of the Korean people as 
well as resolve the terrible life circumstances of the North Korean people. 
Kim’s regime has tried to find a solution to the continuous economic crisis in NK; 
for example, NK established SEZs near the border with China and SK. However, since it 
insists on maintaining its closed economy, NK’s efforts did not lead to a boost in foreign 
investment. Nevertheless, the Kim regime has continued to enjoy luxury. Since NK 
considers that maintaining its system is the most important value, it cannot overcome its 
economic crisis without an open-door policy. Thus, SK should find a method to draw NK 
into the international community. In the long-term, increasing exchanges between the two 
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Koreas would lead to Korean unification. German unification showed that a well-
prepared unification reduces the unification cost and social chaos. 
This thesis explores how much the SK government would be required to pay in 
three sectors: manufacturing, the food industry, and infrastructure. To improve NK’s 
economy, the development of these elements are necessary, and they cannot be privatized 
in the early unification. Thus, a unified government’s expenditure in the three areas 
should be efficient and systematic. 
In manufacturing, a unified government could pay its unification cost within its 
budget during the initial five years. According to the development of NK’s economy, 
however, industrial subsidies would increase; as a result, the government’s burden would 
also increase. From the mid-stage of unification, the investment of private enterprises in 
SK and MNCs should be active in order to reduce the economic burden of the 
government. To attract various investment, a unified government should reform NK’s 
economy through restructuring. Initial successful reform could give various investors 
credit; as a result, the government could overcome its deficit in the late stage of 
unification.  
Since NK has lasted severe food crises, the reform of NK’s agriculture would be 
needed immediately after the unification. With the abolition of collective farms, a unified 
government would contribute to increase its agricultural productivity and profits; 
however, if the government follows SK’s food programs and policies, it would face a 
serious deficit. To increase its agricultural competitiveness, the SK government has 
provided diverse subsidies for farmers. These policies could have a reverse effect on rural 
households in NK. In addition, to protect domestic farmers, the agricultural sector is a 
difficult sector in which to introduce FDI. Consequently, the government should 
encourage farmers to increase competition by disseminating farming technology and 
knowledge, rather than giving subsidies.   
The development of infrastructure would indirectly contribute to different 
industrial development and help to enhance national competition. Thus, in the early 
unification, a unified government would be necessary to increase its expenditure. After 
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the end of the Korean War in 1953, NK concentrated on constructing railways to enable a 
stable supply of war materials; however, its railways are inefficient. To accomplish 
balanced growth, a unified government needs to reform its railway system and develop its 
road system to reduce logistical costs. If the government maintains NK’s railway, it 
would be required to pay beyond its budget; however, successful reforms in railway 
would give financial stability to the government. Consequently, the government should 
strive for a transition to the balanced transport system of rail and road. 
In conclusion, a unified government would not be able to support manufacturing 
among the aforementioned three elements within its budget system; however, the support 
of the international community would be a good solution. Powerful countries have “a 
strong economic and political interest in seeing Korea unified.”123 The United States 
supports the idea that a unified Korea would be a democratic capitalist state.124 If the 
unification is accomplished, the trade between the United States and NK would increase 
up to “approximately $1 billion, with a possible additional $300-425 million in services 
trade.”125 In addition, the United States could peacefully remove WMDs and nuclear 
programs in NK.  
Since it is the most supportive country to NK, China holds the key to achieve 
Korean unification. The aforementioned security and economic benefits for China would 
be able to attract China’s support of Korean unification. From a geopolitical perspective, 
a peaceful atmosphere of unification would reduce the danger of military conflicts in East 
Asia. Since an investment is required to create a safer environment on the Korean 
peninsula, the geopolitical conflict would reduce. Conversely, the geoeconomic value 
would increase: “China’s expected benefit from business cooperation and investments 
with a unified Korea would be far greater than its incremental cost from the increased 
military deployment along the border after unification.”126 In addition, according to Jin 
Jingi, the GDP of the three northeast Chinese provinces would achieve about 51 million 
                                                 
123 Noland, “A Study to Analyze Cost-Benefits,” 144.   
124Ibid.  
125Ibid.  
126Pak, “China’s Cost-Benefit Analysis,” 25.  
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RMB, their export would increase up to $992 million, and retail consumer goods would 
be nearly 36 billion RMB if FDI in three provinces rises by 1% in 2020.127 
According to Snyder’s theory, “the more dependent a state is, the more likely it is 
that the costs and risks of abandonment will outweigh the costs and risks of 
entrapment.”128 Since SK is the more dependent state in the alliance with the United 
States, it bears the risks of abandonment. In the case of Korean unification, the action of 
SK to gain the support of China can sometimes increase the risk of abandonment. To 
minimize the dilemma, the ROK government needs to match its strategic interests with 
that of the United States through continuous dialogue and communication. By stressing 
the benefits of unification to the international community as well as the United States, the 
ROK government is required to politicize its unification and be proactive in the process 
of unification.  
China has a concern that a unified Korea will put forth a thoroughly pro-
American policy. Moreover, territorial disputes and historical conflicts between China 
and Korea would also be potential conflict factors. In this regard, Korea needs to take a 
neutral attitude. While attracting China’s support for Korean unification, it should be 
aware of the alliance dilemma with the United States. In addition, the ROK government 
needs to stress a peaceful unification plan, since NK’s sudden collapse or a military 
conflict of the two Koreas could lead to a serious crisis in China. By stressing the benefits 
for China in terms of security and economy, the ROK government should lead NK to join 
the international community through the promotion of a sustainable relationship with 
China.  
                                                 
127Jin, “Cost-Benefit Analysis of China due to Korean Unification,” 58.  
128Glenn H. Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” 472. 
 99 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Auerbach, Alan J. “The Fiscal Burden of Korean Reunification: A Generational Account 
Approach.” Berkeley: University of California, Berkeley, Econometrics 
Laboratory, 2004. http://eml.berkeley.edu/~auerbach/burden2.pdf.  
Bank of Korea. “Economic Statistics System of Bank of Korea.” Accessed August 21, 
2015. http://ecos.bok.or.kr.  
Bennett, Bruce W. The Challenge of North Korean Biological Weapons (CT-401). Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND, 2013. http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT401. 
Bibow, See Jorg. “The Economic Consequences of German Unification: The Impact of 
Misguided Macroeconomic Policies.” Levy Institute Public Policy Brief no. 67 
(2001). http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/hili67a.pdf.  
Boot, Max. “Why Is the Iran Deal Bad? Think North Korea.” LA Times, July 21, 2015. 
Brandt, Loren, Debin Ma, and Thomas G. Rawski. “From Divergence to Convergence: 
Reevaluating the History behind China’s Economic Boom.” Journal of Economic 
Literature 52, no. 1 (2014): 45–123. doi:10.1257/jel.52.1.45. 
Cho, Dong-ho. “The Economic Cost and Benefit of Unification.” In Division Cost and 
Unification Cost, edited by Dong-ho Cho. Seoul: Korea Institute of National 
Unification, 1997. 
———. “Unification Benefit Is Larger than Unification Cost.” Institute for Unification 
Education. Seoul: Ministry of Unification in Korea. Last modified May 2, 2011. 
http://www.uniedu.go.kr/uniedu/pds/view.do?atclSn=1246&mcd=MC10001222&
currPage=2&listScale=20&pageScale=10&inDivSet=PDS0000121. 
Cho, Han-bum, Kyuryoon Kim, Seok-jin Kim, Hyung-gi Kim, Mun-su Yang, Myung-jin 
Lee, Gang-taek Yim, Seung-chul Jung, and Sun-jae Hwang. A Research on the 
Costs and Benefits of Korean Unification: Political, Social, and Economic Areas. 
Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 2013.    
Choi, Yi-seop. “NK State-Owned Enterprises Estimates about 554.” Financial 
Supervisory Service. Last modified February 28, 2015. 
http://www.fss.or.kr/fss/kr/promo/flash/flash_view.jsp?seqno=43457&no=1309&
page=76&s_kind=&s_title=. 
ESS. “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: Prevalence of Undernutrition.” Rome: 





Gabroussenko, Tatiana. “Calls for Self-Sacrifice in North Korean Creative Writing in the 
Late 1900s to 2000s.” The Journal of Korean Studies 13, no. 1 (2008): 29–56. 
https://muse.jhu.edu.libproxy.nps.edu/journals/journal_of_korean_studies/summa
ry/v013/13.1.gabroussenko.html.  
Foster, Peter. “North Korea Faces Famine: ‘Tell the World We Are Starving.’” 
Telegraph, July 16, 2011. http://www.telegraph.co.uk 
/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/8641946/North-Korea-faces-famine-Tell-the-
world-we-are-starving.html.  
Grabowski, Marcin. “Korean Unification Prospects and the United States’ Policy.” Ad 
Americam: Journal of American Studies 14 (2013): 37–49. ProQuest 
(1516048014). 
Hong, Joon Seok. “The Economic Costs of Korean Reunification.” Spice Digest, Fall 
2001. http://fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/Korean_Reunification.pdf. 
Jin, Jingi. “Cost-Benefit Analysis of China due to Korean Unification.” Seoul: Ministry 
of Unification. Last modified February 16, 2015.  
http://www.unikorea.go.kr/content.do?cmsid=3096&mode=view&page=&cid=42
632.  
Kaesong Industrial District Management Committee. “The Enterprises Status.” KIC Web. 
Accessed August 21, 2015. https://www.kidmac.com/kor 
/contents.do?menuNo=100158.  
Kang, Moonsung, Hyung Joo Kim, Manjong Lee, Young Hoon Lee, Jong-Wha Lee, 
Hongsik Lee, Soon-chan Park, and Ju Hyun Pyun. Gradual Economic Integration 
between South and North Korea and Economic Cooperation in Northeast Asia. 
Seoul: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, 2014. 
http://www.kiep.go.kr/skin.jsp?bid=pub_main_view&grp=publication&num=186
051&page=&tabValue=2. 
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy and Korea Institute for Industrial 
Economics and Trade. Korea Economic Community Promotion Initiative. Seoul: 
Ministry of Unification, 2011. 
http://www.korea.kr/archive/expDocView.do?docId=30610.  
Kim, Ellen. “President Park Geun-hye’s Dresden Declaration.” CSIS Asia Program Blog. 
April 10, 2014. http://cogitasia.com/president-park-geun-hyes-dresden-
declaration. 
 101 
Kim, Kyung-sul, South Korea and North Korea Energy Cooperation Ways Research. 
Ulsan, ROK: Korea Energy Economics Institute, 2012. 
https://www.nkis.re.kr:4445/researchReport_view.do?otpId=B41001800022429.  
Kim, Kyuryoon, Byung-Duck Hwang, Kyung-suk Kim, Inhui Park, Byung-in Bae, Dong-
hui Lee, Sang-Jun Lee, Hyewon Jun, Jaewoo Joo, and Sun-jik Hong. New 
Approach to the Costs/Benefits of Korean Unification: Adopting Comprehensive 




Kim, Kyuryoon, and Hyunggi Kim. “Unification Funding and the Perception of Public.”  
Seoul, ROK: Korea Institute for National Unification. Last modified February 3, 
2015. http://www.unikorea.go.kr/content.do?cmsid= 
3096&mode=view&page=2&cid=42534. 
Kim, Won-bae. “Basic Design of Infrastructure Development in the Korean Peninsula.” 
Anyang, Gyeonggi-do: Korea Research Institute for Human Settlements 
(KRIHS). Last modified December 20, 2006. 
http://library.krihs.re.kr/upload/publication/publication/2006-43.pdf. 
Koblentz, Gregory. “Pathogens as Weapons: The International Security Implications of 
Biological Warfare,” International Security 28, no. 3 (Winter 2003/2004): 84–
122. http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/koblentz.pdf.  
Korean Workers’ Party, Economic Dictionary II. Pyongyang: Social Science, 1985. 
Lange, Thomas, and Geoffrey Pugh, The Economics of German Unification. Cheltenham, 
UK: Edward Elgar, 1998. 
Lim, Kang-taek. Analysis of Economic Effect of NK’s War Industry. Seoul: Korea 
Institute for National Unification, 2000. 
Lee, Sangjun, Chun-gyu Kim, and Baek-jin Lee. “A Study on the 100 Major Inter-
Korean Cooperation Issues Focusing on Spatial Development for the Korean 
Peninsula.” Anyang, Gyonggi-do: Korea Research Institute for Human 
Settlements. Last modified October 31, 2012. 
http://library.krihs.re.kr/upload/publication/s_report/0000061622.pdf.  
National Assembly Budget Office. “Economic Effect of Korean Unification.” Seoul: 
Ministry of Unification. Last modified December 22, 2014. 
http://www.unikorea.go.kr/content.do?cmsid=3096&mode=view&page=&cid=42368. 
———. “The Analysis of 2006 National Budget.” Seoul: National Assembly of ROK. 




———. “The Long-Term Finance Prospect Analysis.” Seoul: National Assembly of 
ROK. Last modified June 25, 2012. http://www.nabo.go.kr/Sub/04Etc 
/popReport.jsp?funcSUB=view&bid=19&arg_id=3674. 
———. “The Mid-Term Requirement in Agriculture and Fishery.” Seoul: National 
Assembly of ROK. Last modified August 27, 2012. 
http://www.nabo.go.kr/Sub/04Etc/popReport.jsp?funcSUB=view&bid=19&arg_i
d=3792. 
———. “The Mid-Term Requirement in Industry and Energy.” Seoul: National 
Assembly of ROK. Last modified October 31, 2011. 
http://www.nabo.go.kr/Sub/04Etc/popReport.jsp?funcSUB=view&bid=19&arg_i
d=3330. 
Noland, Marcus. “A Study to Analyze Cost-Benefits of the Reunification of Korean 
Peninsula to the United States.” Seoul: Ministry of Unification. Last modified 
February 16, 2015. http://www.unikorea.go.kr/content.do?cmsid= 
3096&mode=view&page=&cid=42366.  
Noland, Marcus, Sherman Robinson, and Tao Wang. “Modeling Korean Unification.” 
Journal of Comparative Economics 28, no. 2 (2000): 400–21. 
http://torpedo.nrl.navy.mil.libproxy.nps.edu/tu/ps/doc.html?dsn=2140832. 
Pak, Kiejoon. “China’s Cost-Benefit Analysis of a Unified Korea: South Korea’s 
Strategic Approaches.” The Journal of East Asian Affairs 26, no. 2 (2012): 25–52. 
ProQuest (1322715495). 
Pollack, Jonathan D. “Is Xi Jinping Rethinking Korean Unification?” Presentation at the 
3rd Korea Research Institute for Security-Brookings Joint Conference, Seoul, 
Korea, January 20, 2015. http://www.brookings.edu/research/presentations 
/2015/01/20-xi-jinping-korean-unification-pollack.    
Rhee, Kang Suk. “Korea’s Unification: The Applicability of the German Experience.” 
Asian Survey 33, no. 4 (1993): 360–75. 
Republic of Korea (ROK) Ministry of National Defense, Defense White Paper (MND, 
2000–14). Seoul: ROK Ministry of National Defense. 
Republic of Korea (ROK) Ministry of Strategy and Finance. “Summary of Budget for 
FY2015.” Seoul: ROK. Last modified January 30, 2015. 
http://www.korea.kr/archive/expDocView.do?docId=35932.  
 103 
Republic of Korea (ROK) Ministry of Strategy and Finance. “The Budget of Korea in 
2015.” ROK. Accessed March 19, 2015. 
http://www.budget.go.kr/front/web/datas/budget2015.do?mode=intro.  
Republic of Korea (ROK) Ministry of Unification. “Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund.” 
Seoul: Ministry of Unification. Accessed by August 23, 2015. 
http://www.unikorea.go.kr/content.do?cmsid=3100. 
———. “North Korea Macroeconomic.” North Korea Information Portal. Accessed 
August 22, 2015. 
http://nkinfo.unikorea.go.kr/nkp/overview/nkOverview.do?sumryMenuId=EC20. 
———. North Korea Understanding. Seoul: Institute for Unification Education, 2014. 
Schirokauer, Conrad, and Donald Clark. Modern East Asia: A Brief History, 2nd ed. 
Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2008. 
Schmitz, Jonathan L. “The Economic Implications of Korean Unification.” Master’s 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2002. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/5844. 
Seo, Jae-jun. “Kim Says that We Should Not Depend on Foreign Trade.” News 1 of -
Korea, March 31, 2015. http://news1.kr/articles/?2162601. 
Shen, Zuihua, and Yafeng Xia. Mao and the Sino-Soviet Partnership, 1945–1959: A New 
History. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2015. 
Shin, Jong-Ho, and Jae- Yong Chung. “The Four Major Rivers Restoration Project 
in South Korea.” Proceeding of the Institution of Civil Engineers 164, no. 1 
(2011): 19–26. doi:10.1680/cien.2011.164.19.  
Snyder, Glenn H. “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics.” World Politics 36, no. 4 
(1984): 461–95. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010183. 





Terry, Sue Mi. “A Korea Whole and Free.” Foreign Affairs 93, no. 4 (2014). 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2014-05-29/korea-whole-and-free. 
Terry, Sue Mi, and Max Boot. “The Wrong Lessons from North Korea.” Foreign Affairs, 
April 22, 2015. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-korea/2015-04-
22/wrong-lessons-north-korea. 
 104 
The White House. The Iran Nuclear Deal: What You Need to Know about the JCPOA. 
July 14, 2015. https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files 
/docs/jcpoa_what_you_need_to_know.pdf.  
Tiezzi, Shannon. “How China Could Benefit from a United Korea.” Diplomat, January 
14, 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/how-china-could-benefit-from-a-
united-korea. 
———. “South Korea’s President and China’s Military Parade.” Diplomat, September 3, 
2015. http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/south-koreas-president-and-chinas-
military-parade.  
U.S. Department of Defense. “Preventing Nuclear Proliferation and Nuclear Terrorism.” 
In Nuclear Posture Review Report, 9–14. Washington, DC: Department of 
Defense, April 2010. http://archive.defense.gov/npr/docs 
/2010%20Nuclear%20Posture%20Review%20Report.pdf. 
Vogel, Frederick J. The Chemical Weapons Convention: Strategic Implications for the 
United States. Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1996. 
http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=AD
A309251.  
Walker, Paul F. “Abolishing Chemical Weapons: Progress, Challenges, and 
Opportunities,” Arms Control Today 40, no. 9 (November 2010): 22–30. 
http://search.proquest.com/openview/cd82ff3fde274f40bb1a9ac702c8d8d1/1?pq-
origsite=gscholar.   
Wolf, Charles, Jr. “Korean Reunification: How It Might Come about and at What Cost.” 
Defence and Peace Economics 17, no. 6 (December 2006): 681–90. 
Wolf, Charles, Jr., and Kamiljon T. Akramov. North Korean Paradoxes: Circumstances, 
Costs, and Consequences of Korean Unification. Santa Monica: RAND, 2005. 
Yang, Nakgu. “The Closure of the Kaesong Industrial Complex.” Asian Economy, April 
29, 2013. http://www.asiae.co.kr/news/view.htm?idxno=2013042709333197493. 
You, Hun. “New Rural Budget Design,” The Jibang-haeng Jung 21, no. 229 (1972): 50–
59. http://kiss.kstudy.com/journal/thesis_name.asp?tname= 
kiss2002&key=1774959. 
Zong, Jie, and Jeanne Batalova. “Korean Immigrants in the United States.” Washington, 




INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
